

**SUBMISSION BY LGEN THE HONOURABLE ROMEO DALLAIRE**  
**TO THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE FORUM REVIEW OF 28 JUNE 2016**

I wish to thank the Minister and staff for this opportunity to present a brief to this committee. I strongly support and consider it essential that the Canadian Defence policy statement supports the concept of whole of government: building upon the recent proven experiences of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and other Departments of the Canadian Government within the broad spectrum of operations conducted overseas and at home. On numerous occasions they have successfully bridged the historic gaps that existed between uniformed “security forces” (military and police), our civilian defence workers and civilian aid agencies, as well as the Government of Canada and Canadian partners in reconceptualising the human security environment. DND and CAF must continue to be proactive in introducing such innovative approaches to preventing conflict overseas and reducing internal threats to Canada.

A defence policy statement provides strategic guidance and is an instrument of focus for the DND/CAF team. Thus, it is essential that those who are responsible for its creation, its interpretation and its implementation possess the skills and knowledge and experience to be able to function effectively at the strategic level. Below, I will enumerate a number of recommendations and suggestions to be considered for incorporation in this defence review. But first, I have one, overarching recommendation, without which, any review of Defence will be meaningless: **the General/Flag Officer Corps must actively engage in ongoing formal education and professional development.**

Such education and professional development is woven through an officer’s career, but intensifies in the area of military strategy, grand strategy and civil military relations beginning as early as at the rank of Major. It is essential that this development continue unabated throughout the General/Flag Officer corps. It is my opinion that although these very senior officers have proven their mastery at the tactical and operational levels of conflict, there is a dearth of strategic competency, both in the field and in particular back home in garrison at the corporate and senior executive levels in Ottawa. I strongly recommend that **a formal and robust professional development programme be developed** for these senior military executives. This would include executive education (e.g. management skills) comparable to that of their civilian colleagues in the public service.

A new conceptual framework is required to meet the challenges of our era, yet very little is even being considered beyond adapting tactics and methods of the old classic Cold War era to fit a completely different conflict environment. As such, there is a serious need to inculcate a much more profound knowledge through hard research and intellectual rigour in the General/Flag Officer corps. Then and only then will we be able to finally get ahead of the game and wrest the initiative from the bad guys, whoever they may be at the time.

The following are more specific issues for your consideration, in no set priority:

1. Canada’s national security practitioners need to self-identify as a strong community of practice based on mutually shared core competency. The excellent work being done by the directorate of Strategic Concepts, Leadership and Engagement in Military Personnel Generation Command must be enhanced and its recommendations implemented at the earliest opportunity.

Furthermore, other **government departments within the whole of government security solution must establish a dedicated permanency within their structures.** Then they will be able to constantly monitor the security situations evolving at home and abroad, and be in a position to produce contingency plans and even exercise them (as has been created by the US National Security Advisor in its preventive approach to responding to mass atrocities).

2. In response to the spectrum of employment of the CAF in a multi-role capacity due to the unpredictability of the threats at home and abroad, there is a fundamental requirement that the CAF acquire or have access to some non-traditional civilian skills and knowledge into the arsenal of tools required. It is my recommendation that **the Reserve Force (under a revised total force concept) be elevated in its capabilities and its integration with the Regular Force by the reintegration of the ten/ninety concept,** where 10% of the Reserves would be augmented right down to the unit level by Regular Force personnel.
3. We are a Nordic nation that faces growing threats in our Arctic expanse. It is my recommendation that we provide the CAF with capabilities and opportunities to expand their presence in the **Arctic** and on the vulnerable

coasts, and as such integrate our North American defence into a more comprehensive operational capability. To do so I recommend the following actions:

- i **Canada should immediately join the US Missile Defence System** by granting permission for a radar site to be established in Canada, and by integrating our more land-based North American defence by joining deliberately with **the US North American Defence Command** co-located at the NORAD Headquarters.
  - ii The **Rangers** must be given the assets and opportunities to train for deployment on the water in order to conduct surveillance in the open areas.
  - iii We should create a **Northern version of the US Core of Engineers**; an integrated force made up of military engineers and Aboriginal peoples that will be dedicated to Arctic engineering and construction, and as such deploy throughout the North in order to enhance and meet the enormous and urgent infrastructure deficiencies in those communities. This force would be supported in cooperation with other government departments, including Indian Affairs.
  - iv The Northern Patrol Ship Project is exceptionally limited in its value to either patrol and assist in a catastrophe, due to its one-meter-thick ice limitation and no helicopter-carrying capacity. So, I recommend that **the Canadian Navy be equipped with its own icebreaker capability and a heavy lift amphibious ship** that could fulfill multiple roles from hospital to deployment of forces and equipment in moments of crisis and difficulty.
  - v There is a need to inculcate in the CAF an in-depth level of skills and experience in operations in the Arctic in all weather conditions that can only be achieved by establishing a **garrison or school** in such a place as Arctic Bay. This would also serve to **sustain a presence (up to a battalion strength) across the North on a constant basis** (under a normal rotation policy).
4. There are also a number of innovative approaches that can be offered by the DND CAF in concert with a **whole of government construct to meet the challenges in foreign lands** that affect the security and peace of all humanity, as well as the self-interest of Canadians:
- i. There are allied countries that seek to work closer with Canadian forces in regions such as Africa to help build capacity and professionalization of those forces, as assisting them in becoming self-reliant. We should seek out such countries as the UK, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Germany as examples of interested allies.
  - ii. The capability of providing instruction and information to assist developing countries in security matters (military and police) should become an operational commitment by the CAF, and to do so I recommend that **the DMTC program be substantially enhanced and focused particularly in regions of the Middle East, Sub Sahara, Africa, and South America**. To achieve this I strongly believe that the extensive employment of Reserves and veterans be the core of this body of instructional capability overseas. Furthermore, **an MOU should be established between the expanded DMTC capability and such institutions as the PSTC and the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative at Dalhousie University** to deliver at home and abroad the training envisaged in this new era of peace operations.
  - iii. I believe that **stronger deployment of our intelligence capabilities abroad and a more intimate integration of its capabilities with our National Public Security organizations be initiated with the Public Security department** in order to cover the full spectrum of potential threats at home and abroad and provide the CF with much broader access and knowledge of intelligence assets.
  - iv. I recommend we develop a **strong cadre of well-trained, experienced officers and NCOs to assist in training contingents from developing countries deploying to UN peace missions**, providing them not only with sophisticated operational expertise, but also building their capacity and developing their ethos. Without this, it is my belief that our return to peace operations with either the UN or regional organizations will not achieve significant results.
  - v. I recommend a **front running commitment of French language military and civilian personnel to the UN and to the African Union, on a significant basis, to assist in the development of the skills and knowledge of francophone countries to meet challenges of security and stability**. This must be done in concert with a

equivalent rise in police presence and capabilities as part of the security force capability being introduced to these countries.

- vi. There is a need for an in-depth multidisciplinary and whole of government strategic **assessment of the impact of climate change** into the next ten years (at least), in order to provide a threat assessment inside Canada and beyond our borders. For example, Canada should prepare and train significant forces (veterans, Reserves and Regulars Force) in the demanding task of firefighting in forest areas that are creating vulnerabilities in our infrastructure and putting our communities in the North at risk. Aids to this mission, such the introduction of drones and the significant enhancement of communications throughout the North, would in my opinion provide depth to our commitment.
- vii. With the reopening of what seems to be the European front by recent aggressive advances by the Russian nation, I would consider it grossly imprudent to reduce in any way the outright classic combat capabilities of the CAF to face a more classic lethal threat. This means the continued requirement for **combat naval capabilities**, including submarines, for **armour and mobility** provided by tanks and advanced armour personnel carriers, by **closed support aircraft**, and continued enhancement of **helicopter combat capability** to meet this potential threat. All this capability cannot function unless it is under the protection of a **cyber command**.
- viii. The use of children in armed conflict is a threat that is being deployed by state and non-state actors around the world, and increasingly here in Canada where children are being radicalized or joining domestic gangs. This threat is harmful to the children themselves, of course, but the Child Soldier Initiative out of Dalhousie University has also discerned a real psychological impact on our soldiers engaging with children in combat scenarios. **I propose DND and CAF work with the Romeo Dallaire Child Soldier Initiative to introduce a new doctrinal framework that will assist in providing new tactics, new training and potentially new equipment to face this threat.** This must be done in concert with other security forces (e.g. police) and also in close cooperation with the humanitarian agencies. This should be disseminated by DND/CAF throughout the troop contributing nations of the UN and AU, and ultimately integrated into national standards that will affect the attitudes and even ethos of professional armies around the world. This is a new capability to offer to the world of peacekeeping operations.
- ix. I fully support the very progressive proposal that is being presented to the minister and to the staff involved with this policy review by the Military Family Support Centre executive directors. Families of CAF personnel are a force multiplier that has been relegated for far too long to merely a role of support. New communication technologies mean families are being affected directly by the deployments of their members. And the moral complexities of these missions mean families as well as troops are at risk of psychological casualty. **The federal government, provincial health authorities, DND, CAF, and VAC must work together to enhance the OSISS program and create a worthy covenant of care for veterans and their families.**
- x. I believe that it is essential that **the gap between DND and VAC be eliminated** (versus being bridged) for our veterans. I considerate imperative that the chain of loyalty not be broken even though the uniform may be removed, and so doing I believe it essential that VAC become a component of DND within its protected budget.

I have not broached the subjects of numbers of members in the Forces nor budgetary allocation. Briefly, it is my opinion that the recommendations above, and others in the Department's strategic plans, could be efficiently implemented if troop-to-task assessments consider the Regular Force supplemented by the Reserves (10/90), the supplementary Reserves, and those veterans still willing to deploy.