

## DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

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### **Threats to Security**

- **Terrorism:** an elusive threat by its nature, its structure, and its operational methods; however, this threat calls for closer collaboration between the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and law enforcement agencies. The geographical dimension of our country means that all CAF units may be expected to play an important role
- **The Arctic:** The recent conduct of exercises should not hide the fact that the CAF are particularly disadvantaged to operate in this environment as soon as ice emerges. It is necessary to increase the level of surveillance in this region (Rangers, satellite observation, acoustic underwater sensors, etc.) both on the surface and under the polar cap. The economic and geostrategic importance of this parcel of our territory deserves more resources allocated to it.
- **Cyberspace:** the penetration of cyber into all facets of Canadian society constitutes a growing vulnerability. The potential role of the CAF to fight against attacks in cyberspace is quite limited; however, attacks in this domain can have consequences as disastrous as the worst environmental storms; for example, an attack on the management of hydroelectric dams or nuclear power plants could call for a massive CAF intervention to secure a geographical area, evacuate personnel, etc. It is therefore important to continue to identify these vulnerabilities in the same spirit as the Year 2000 problem (Y2K).

### **Defence of North America**

Since the creation of NORAD, the mandate of military cooperation between the United States and Canada has evolved to include the maritime approaches of both countries; this component should remain and should probably be enhanced, especially with respect to northern approaches; indeed, the melting of the polar cap increases the number of scenarios of a maritime threat in this sector. This threat can be military or ecological; NORAD detection methods should be evaluated to confirm whether these potential threats can be detected; of course, the question of capacity to counter a threat in an environment so difficult and fragile remains.

Obviously, the access to long-range missiles by countries having governments with warlike intentions (North Korea) reinforces the need to protect systems that can counter such a threat.

### **Peacekeeping Operations**

These operations are no longer the sole prerogative of the United Nations; indeed, since the Brahimi report, these operations can be entrusted to regional organizations such as NATO. We must face the harsh reality of contemporary peacekeeping operations; it is no longer missions like the Suez Canal or Cyprus! Deployed troops must be ready to fight to impose peace and especially to protect civilians who have become the victims of these intra-state conflicts. For the CAF to be effective in these PKOs, the following conditions must be met:

- Canadian diplomacy should influence the drafting of mission mandates in order to ensure clarity and above all clearly state the conditions of an exit strategy for the CAF to pass the torch to other countries.
- Another aspect of PKOs that must be improved before any deployment: the government-wide approach certainly deserves to be well harmonized within all departments contributing to the mission, especially at the Canadian strategic level.
- Scenarios for employing the CAF in these missions must be validated according to the optimization of capabilities that the CAF can contribute to a PKO; for example, improving our airlift capability enables rapid deployment for the initial phase of a mission (e.g., the French forces quickly deployed in Mali before handing over the role to ECOWAS troops); strengthening by the UN of the intelligence function within PKOs enables the deployment of small elements "à la carte" according to the particular needs of a mission (intelligence unit, special forces patrol, deployment of drones, etc.).
- In the context of peacekeeping, Canada has joined other countries sharing the same values to emphasize certain aspects of peacekeeping; for example, SHIRBRIG was a very popular instrument with the UN, and a concept which meets its current first priority — that is, the rapid deployment of a UN force after all negotiations have failed.

### **Structure of the CAF**

The nature of potential CAF missions urges caution regarding structural changes; the very nature of the geographical size of the country also urges caution in the geographic dispersion of units (especially land) to respond to needs. The cuts made since the '90s have greatly undermined the capacity of support in operations, particularly with respect to 1st and 2nd line support, thus limiting the deployment of subunits and forcing military planners to limit concentrations of troops to a single place (Visoko, Kabul, Kandahar). While emerging trends call for autonomous sub-units capable of operating and supporting themselves in a more independent manner, the present constraints deserve to be evaluated.

### **Support for the CAF**

The implicit contract between a country and its soldiers should be strengthened. The CAF is an institution whose members are volunteers, and they anticipate that the government who deploys troops realizes that the military expect to be treated with respect and dignity, whatever their condition upon returning from a mission.

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