DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW

SUMMARY OF ROUNDTABLE CONSULTATIONS

OCTOBER 24TH, 2016

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Defence Policy Review (DPR) was undertaken to refresh Canada’s national defence strategy through consultations with a wide range of stakeholders. As a part of the DPR process, the Department of National Defence (DND) commissioned Ipsos Public Affairs to conduct two phases of consultations: the Defence Expert Roundtables and the Online Public Consultation.

This report presents the findings of the Defence Expert Roundtable Consultations. It is a synthesis of feedback expressed by participants across seven roundtable events hosted by an Ipsos facilitator between April and July 2016.

Over the course of these seven events, 95 experts representing stakeholders from academia and industry to the military and First Nations gathered around tables from coast to coast to coast to participate in full-day facilitated discussions touching on a range of issues and themes within the DPR. Invited to participate by DND, they were joined by the Minister of National Defence, his Parliamentary Secretary, the Minister of Veterans Affairs as well as members of the DPR Advisory Panel, who participated actively and engaged in lively debate with participants.

Participants appreciated the opportunity to contribute substantive feedback to an in-depth defence policy review. Many encouraged more frequent consultations with defence experts and industry going forward to facilitate communication on key issues.

Each of the seven full-day roundtable discussions was held to seek perspectives, insight and recommendations from defence stakeholders and experts. These sessions explored the DPR Consultation Paper and the defence issues facing Canada, as well as any topics pertinent to those present. The discussions were thoughtful and respectful, with each participant demonstrating both a high level of familiarity and expertise in his or her area of specialty as well as a willingness to provide input on an overall approach to defence. Each session followed the Chatham House Rule, and while the discussions were guided by the DPR Consultation Paper, the expert participants were able to express their opinions with regard to the issues that should be considered as part of the DPR. While some participants came prepared with written statements to present to the group, a conversational and less formal tone was encouraged in all roundtable sessions.

DND will use the results of this consultation and its consultation with Canada’s allies, Parliament and input from the DPR Advisory Panel to develop the policies that will guide the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) going forward.
2.0 CONTEXT

2.1 Background

The Minister of National Defence’s mandate letter tasked him to “conduct an open and transparent review process to create a new defence strategy for Canada.” The 2015 Speech from the Throne further emphasized the government’s commitment to a defence review noting that, “to keep Canadians safe and be ready to respond when needed, the Government will launch an open and transparent process to review existing defence capabilities, and will invest in building a leaner, more agile, better-equipped military.”

The Minister of National Defence has also emphasized the need for an “open and transparent” process that is supported by robust, relevant and credible consultations with defence stakeholders, including the public, Parliament, defence experts (industry, commentators and academics), as well as defence allies and partners.

The CAF is a national institution with a critical mandate at the heart of the government’s most fundamental responsibility: protecting Canadians, defending Canada and promoting Canadian interests. A renewed defence policy will outline the government’s priorities and objectives for national defence and the CAF, forming the basis for complex decision making across all levels of the Defence Team. It is critical that the review process be informed by the diverse perspectives of a broad range of defence stakeholders.

2.2 Objective/Purpose

The objective of the consultation exercises stated herein is to engage with defence stakeholders and the public in an open and transparent way so that their views are considered as an informational input to DND’s upcoming policy renewal process.

2.3 Summary of Defence Consultation Paper

DND published a Public Consultation Paper to be used as the basis for the consultations. This paper includes a brief exploration of the trends, challenges and opportunities facing defence and solicits input through a series of targeted questions. While input from the public was sought on a number of topics, the general themes of the questions relate to:

• domestic and international trends, threats and challenges facing Canada;
• the role of the military in responding to these trends; and,
• how the military should be resourced to carry out these tasks.

To view the Public Consultation Paper, please visit: http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp
3.0 RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION

3.1 Reading this Report

In reading this report, please consider that this is based on ideas, opinions and perspectives presented by those present at the roundtable events. This is a summary of the discussion across these events, as one component of the larger Defence Policy Review. It is not reflective of the overall review process, to be completed in Spring 2017. More information about the full review process is available in the Appendix.

Discussion at the live events did not follow a formal structure, and many topics were discussed at various points through the conversation. While an agenda was presented for the day-long sessions, this agenda was a guideline for the proceedings and question areas. Topics for discussion varied depending on the flow of conversation between participants. As such, the thematic summaries of content do not reflect the same themes within the Public Consultation Paper but rather the common themes of discussion heard over the course of the seven events.

3.2 Analysis of Discussion

Each of the roundtables was summarized by Ipsos staff present at the sessions and each session was also recorded in order to provide verbatim transcripts for analysis. The transcripts and summaries were then synthesized and organized into a thematic content analysis. Key themes from the different events were grouped together to get a picture of each topic discussed from different perspectives represented in the overall discussion of Canada’s national defence policy.
4.0 SYNTHESIS OF DISCUSSIONS
4.0 SYNTHESIS OF DISCUSSIONS

The roundtable discussions covered a broad range of issues.

What follows is a summary of the key themes that emerged across all seven of the roundtable discussions. Detailed summaries of each consultation session follow later in this report.

4.1 Threats and Challenges

Across all sessions, there was general agreement that, on its own, Canada faces few significant, imminent and existential threats. However, it was acknowledged that, since the last policy consultation, the world has changed from one of isolated nations protecting borders and national economies to a world where allied relationships are and should be working together to ensure global security and protect the global economy. At the time of the discussions, some participants felt that there were likely no weapons trained specifically on the landmass delineated by Canadian borders, there are significant threats to the safety and security of the world. In this globalized era, the actions of terrorists and non-state actors in ungoverned spaces and aggressive states which are a threat to an ally or partner in any region also constitute a threat to Canada. When discussing these significant global threats, many spoke of the complexity and uncertainty that such threats present and the difficulty in preparing to confront or counter them. The discussion focused on identifying threats that are a priority to address; while not a key focus for the discussion, the overall sense among the group was that there can always be more done to address threats.

Among these threats, the impacts of climate change emerged as an issue of significant concern in each discussion. Most agreed that global warming is driving serious changes in the physical landscape and resulting in a rise in the number of major natural disasters. The effects are numerous and far-reaching: massive population movements, threats to Canada’s critical infrastructure and natural resources, as well as
increased traffic in northern waters. While addressing climate change is not seen as a direct responsibility of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), it is often the CAF that is tasked with responding to its consequences.

Discussion of climate change was almost always accompanied by debate over the North. While the arctic challenge is complex and diverse, most participants referred to threats to our sovereignty and increased marine activity resulting in potential pollution and environmental damage. Many also highlighted the need to work with Indigenous people to create the infrastructure and resource base for northern communities to sustain themselves and thrive rather than struggle to survive. For many, sovereignty seemed to be the crux of the issue. Investing in the region with the support of local communities, improving infrastructure, policing the waters and mitigating the effects of increased arctic traffic are all actions that were suggested to cement our ownership of the land and lend us credibility at the Arctic Governance table.

Another concern was the threat posed by non-state actors and ungoverned spaces. From the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to Boko Haram, new entities have emerged that do not behave like states. The concern was that these new entities do not respect international laws or conventions, and are increasingly leveraging new information and communications technologies to recruit and mobilize followers in the power vacuums of failed states and from individuals within developed nations. Participants indicated that traditional defence strategies have not been adapted to address these threats and Canada must act now to prevent the development of these non-state actors and eliminate those that already exist. Many were also concerned with the potential threat that these non-state actors might pose, both at home and abroad, should they gain access to chemical and biological weapons, as well as develop their ability to attack critical infrastructure through cyber-attacks. Some felt that should this occur, the reach of these non-state actors could extend to span large regions across continents.
Cyber security was also discussed at length in many of the roundtable events. Most agreed that Canada’s cyber security should be a priority for DND, from protecting DND’s and the Government of Canada’s systems to more broadly networks essential to Canadians, such as our financial networks. Cyber was viewed as an area in which DND can lead; however, it is also understood that other agencies and departments, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as well as Public Safety Canada, have a role to play in this regard. However, some felt that Canada is in a position to be a global leader in the knowledge economy and that cyber security is an opportunity for Canada to take the lead. There was concern that Canada is not only failing to seize this opportunity, but is also falling behind its allies and foes in this area.

There was general agreement that Canada must play a role in mitigating any nuclear threat, although differing views emerged on the nature and extent of such involvement. From discussion of nuclear disarmament and the Non-Proliferation Treaty to our possible role in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), many suggested that mitigating the nuclear threat should be an area of focus. Some participants argued that Canada should take a more active role in BMD and take a strong stance against nations developing nuclear capabilities. Others cautioned that increasing Canada’s role in BMD may not produce any significant return on investment and may in fact encourage an arms race, with Russia as a key concern.

There was also substantial discussion of Canada’s role on the international stage with a particular focus on Canada-US relations. Many raised the upcoming presidential election as a concern noting that, regardless of the outcome, Canada’s relationship with the U.S. is likely to change dramatically. Most agreed that Canada’s security (encompassing both physical security and economic stability) is dependent on a positive and productive relationship with the U.S.; however, many were also concerned with over-dependence on the U.S. military capabilities and expressed the need for Canada to be able to act independently. The importance of this relationship was expanded to touch on defence procurement, North American defence and cyber security, as well as international relations and foreign policy. Canada’s strategies should be integrated with those of the U.S. but still allow for independent action if the need arises.

This discussion led many to question whether Canada has defined what it hopes to achieve with its partners and allies, or if Canada is simply being reactive and responding to what others need from Canada. There was a strong call for Canada’s leadership to define the role that it wants to play on the international stage and to manage its relationships (with partners and allies) more strategically and for the benefit of Canada.

Discussion of threats as well as developing relationships also included discussions about Canada’s relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The changing nature of conflict and shifting power dynamics within this region were of particular concern to some. A few viewed the US-Canada partnership as particularly important in this region, while others stressed the need for bilateral relationships with key countries such as China and India.
4.2 A National Strategy

A strong call emerged from all of the discussions that Canada needs a clear national and coordinated national defence strategy that encompasses all actions, investments and operations. Participants indicated that DND and all relevant federal government departments and agencies with similar needs and objectives need a clear, efficient and effective plan to align their national strategies. There is a perception of redundancy and missed opportunity in the current disparate approach which is increasingly leaving Canada unprepared and vulnerable. Participants called for a national defence strategy that is coordinated with an international affairs strategy and integrated into a national industrial strategy, thereby fostering a symbiotic relationship between government defence spending and Canadian innovation. They see an opportunity to leverage common capacities and investments across all departments to ensure that optimal benefit and return on investment can be realized.

Furthermore, they recognized the cross-pollination that can exist between public and private sector research and development, and called for further public-private partnership and engagement.

For Canada’s national defence policy to be successful, most agreed that it needs public support. Many spoke of a lack of public understanding and knowledge of defence issues or of the role of the CAF. This was seen as a key challenge that needs to be addressed regardless of what strategy is developed. Across all audiences, participants called for increased communications and engagement with the public to raise the profile of the CAF and educate them on global security threats and challenges, Canada’s defence operations at home and around the world, and Canada’s role in international security.

4.3 Procurement Challenges

Challenges related to defence procurement arose to some extent in each of the discussions. Procurement and equipment were seen by participants as key issues that would need to be addressed within an overall national strategy. Participants highlighted difficulties with the procurement process and the bureaucracy involved. Others placed priority on increasing transparency in defence procurement, particularly in relation to high-profile, high-value contracts.

A special session on procurement was held in Ottawa among representatives from the defence industry to further explore this issue. The key theme emerging from the discussion was that the government must provide more clarity and predictability in its procurement needs going forward, in order for Canadian innovation to flourish and for Canadian industry to grow. Industry participants in this session also expressed the view that DND needs to engage more regularly and meaningfully with industry. They also called for a clear national industrial strategy that provides direction to the defence industry on procurement plans so that the defence industry can anticipate needs and work closely with government to develop solutions that will achieve a sustainable market.

4.4 Role, Capacity and Capabilities

In the context of global security threats and discussion of the need for a national defence strategy, participants...
were asked to provide their views on the CAF’s current size, structure and capabilities as well as the role the CAF should play both domestically and internationally.

**Canadian Armed Forces Personnel**

There was agreement at each of the roundtable sessions that attention needs to be paid to the treatment of CAF personnel. Some felt that Canada does not adequately support the members of the CAF, including Reservists, Regular Forces personnel and veterans.

Most agreed that there is a need to re-examine the whole approach to personnel, – from recruitment to career progression and retirement, to improve the attractiveness of the CAF as a career choice, to improve retention and to better serve CAF members.

Participants see recruitment techniques as being out-of-date and in need of improvement; moreover, the application and enrollment processes are viewed as unnecessarily lengthy and inefficient. Also noted was that although many of the skills in demand within the CAF are present in the civilian workforce, it is difficult to recruit these civilians into the positions that the CAF has available. This was applicable to the both the Regular Forces and Reservists.

A high priority among participants was the need to improve the overall experience for CAF members, such as benefits and working conditions, so that a career in the CAF is more attractive and fulfilling. From proper training and resources for our Reservists, to health care for the injured and veterans, to adequate support for the families of soldiers, participants drew a long list of improvements that need to be made.

Mental health was another area of concern, with participants calling for more resources and support for CAF members and veterans.

The ability of former CAF members to reintegrate in civilian life and find careers in their field was also of concern. Participants expressed the view that there is currently a lack of support for the process of reintegrating CAF veterans.

Participants suggested that improvements in recruiting will be fruitless if the career offerings are not sufficiently rewarding to ensure retention. Furthermore, some posited that, due to their cost and scope, deliberations over equipment and technology often overshadow consideration for personnel. Many cautioned that if we
continue to overlook personnel, we will be neglecting our most important asset and jeopardizing the future success of the CAF.

**Structure of the Canadian Armed Forces**

With regard to structure, there was extensive debate over the Reserves and rebalancing the CAF. Some said that we should be more strategic about how we use the Reserves, suggesting that they are currently underutilized. For some, this entails a domestic operations focus for the Reserves while others maintained that the CAF should capitalize on the broad and diverse array of skillsets that Reservists bring from their civilian lives. Some participants felt that such skillsets have not yet been identified and catalogued. Many thought that the Reservists could bring specific skills from their careers outside of the CAF to bear in the performance of their military duty. From expertise in technology that could be used in cyber security, to human resources, financial expertise and legal training, many see significant opportunities to draw on much needed expertise that likely already exists among these personnel. In addition, there was debate among participants at some of the roundtables over expanding the scope and role of the Rangers and a call for assessing the overall balance of the three CAF services: Navy, Army and Air Force. Opinions were mixed on what balance is required; however, over the course of the conversations, an increase in the Navy and Air Force were viewed as priorities to address threats to sovereignty, particularly in the North. Many also called for Canada to increase the size of its military to ensure that it has the capacity to support its commitments to its allies and adequately ensure its national defence.

**CAF International Role**

While participants indicated that the role of the CAF would be defined in the national defence strategy, many think that the CAF’s current strengths should assist in prioritizing these roles, as they present an opportunity for the CAF to capitalize on current capabilities. While several possible roles were discussed, the most commonly identified international opportunities were in diplomacy, state-building, conflict prevention and resolution, and peacekeeping. Participants debated the use of the term “peacekeeping”, with some calling for a new definition that goes beyond the traditional role of the blue berets.

Participants’ rationale for this view of Canada’s role in diplomacy was that Canada is not perceived to have the same association with imperialism and colonialism as other nations, and can therefore offer what is perceived as a more neutral perspective. Participants also referred to Canada’s experience and past success in the domains of diplomacy and peacekeeping, and suggested that Canada focus on developing those capacities beyond routine operations on the ground to serve as leaders in training and the development of this field.

**CAF Domestic Role**

There was also debate over what should be included in the CAF’s domestic role. Participants called for a more clearly defined and articulated domestic strategy. While participants acknowledged that the role of the CAF in disaster relief was effective, it was argued that there could be better coordination with civilian entities.
Some also spoke of the CAF’s role in search and rescue, suggesting that it is vital to Canadians and contributes positively to the reputation of the CAF among the general public. Some also expressed that the domestic role needs to be better communicated to the public. This would assist in raising the profile of the CAF and fostering better linkages with communities across the country.

**Equipment and Capabilities Needs**

Canada’s relative size and resources relative to our allies led many participants to question whether Canada should be building full-spectrum capacity or focusing on niche capabilities. While some support the idea of a niche approach, a majority agreed that there is still a need for full-spectrum capacity, indicating that Canada needs the capacity to act independently if required. The general view was that we should maintain a minimum capability in all areas and specialize in those areas that present the most benefit to Canada as well as to our allies and partners. Even if some capabilities are not deployed often if at all, they are valuable in terms of sovereignty and independence, as well as relationship-building with allies and partners (joint-training exercises, supplementing the efforts of others, readiness, etc.). Participants indicated that given the uncertain nature of the threats Canada faces, it is difficult to anticipate all of the country’s future defence needs and suggested that this was a strong rationale for maintaining full-spectrum capabilities. While most acknowledged that developing military capabilities is not done overnight, some suggested that should a specific capability be required urgently, increasing an existing capability is preferable to having to urgently develop one that does not yet exist. Some even suggested that, once a capability has been abandoned, it is very difficult to rebuild.

In terms of equipment, several called for the procurement of more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and drones for use in surveillance. Some supported their use in combat as well. While there was acknowledgement that the risks and implications of their use must be better understood, particularly if they are to be used in combat, most agreed that not investing swiftly in this technology would leave Canada at a disadvantage, as other nations are already doing so.

Cyber was seen as another capability in need of investment. This was discussed from both the view to defend Canada’s networks from the threat of attack as well as from more offensive cyber capabilities. While some cautioned that offensive cyber attacks may increase the threat of attack, others felt that this offensive cyber would support other essential CAF roles.

**4.5 In Their Own Words**

The following quotations were drawn from a range of participants in the roundtable discussions. They are intended to illustrate the overall tone, nature of the discussion, and level of discourse which characterized the roundtable events. They have not been attributed to any individual participant to maintain the integrity of the Chatham House Rule, and no implied ranking or additional weight should be inferred on the basis of the order in which they are presented.
THREATS AND CHALLENGES

When I look at the threats and challenges, the fundamental ones, the only existential threat to our existence, is basically the spread of plutonium and other fissile material getting into the hands of terrorists.

Our classic alliances, with NORAD and hopefully, North American Defence, but with NATO, is just not enough. We, I believe, must open up significant regional capabilities, or engagements with regional bodies, like the African Union, and similar structures, to be in the forefront of engaging the potential threats that are out there.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Climate change going ahead ten to twenty years, is going to be a threat multiplier, particularly in fragile states, as well as a driver of change in places like the Arctic, but also a source of natural disasters that will require presumably military responses. And as well, will generate more climate migrants in more vulnerable parts of the world.

Climate change is clearly an existential threat, but it’s in the future, it’s not the kind of thing that Canadian Forces can be dealing with right now.

My biggest concerns are the threats to our environment. Especially our water. Our water is becoming a very expensive commodity. In some places, more places, it’s probably more expensive than fuel. Probably all over the world, I imagine.
THE NORTH

I think we should create a sort of an Arctic or Northern corps of engineers, à la American corps of engineers, made up of aboriginals, and of Reservists, regulars, who spend their time rotating through the south, and building, rebuilding, and maintaining the infrastructure in the North.

[What] I really worry about is the Arctic, what's going to happen up there, because it is, at the moment, very poorly defended, has very little infrastructure, about the only thing we can count on is the NORAD early warning, and that's pretty much spread out, [...] If we're going to be able to regulate that very environmentally sensitive area, then we have to also be able to back that up with some very strong security.

This policy should consider the protection of, and acknowledge Canada's sovereignty within Arctic waters, off the northern coast of Canada.

I think the North Warning System already is obsolete to begin with. I also see the advantage of not [having] missiles in Canada with respect to BMD, but I do see the advantages in the Arctic, especially about surveillance equipment going up there that would be really a good thing for Canada in my estimation.

NON-STATE ACTORS AND UNGovernED SPACES

The threat from armed, non-state actors that are probably the biggest global threat [...], as we move forward into this undiscovered world, [...] the idea of conventional warfare, is receding, but there are ungoverned spaces that are increasing, that allow for non-state actors to percolate, and [...] the thing that I'm worried about is, right now, we're not seeing them come to our shores, but how safe are we, really?

We have real world, real time incidents of Canadian youth, who have been recruited by forces overseas, and used in active combat, in Daesh or ISIS, whatever you wish to call them. We've documented these instances. And that's not existential, because that's a phenomenon that we see occurring within Canada, when organized criminal groups, criminal organizations employ the same tactics, and take advantage of the same vulnerabilities of Canadian youth. That is a domestic, a domestic security threat that I think the Canadian Forces, as part of a whole of government effort, needs to both be educated on, and to increase the level of cooperation with other government departments, to adequately understand, and look at addressing.

How do we deal with organizations like ISIL that have been very effective in that cyber world of getting their message out, prosecuting operations against us, recruiting people, getting, whatnot, we don't have a capability A, to figure out what's going on out there, or B, how do we influence that entire campaign.
Imagine a cyber attack on our financial institutions, a coordinated attack that undermined the ability of the banking system to function the way it is, it would undermine our economy, and could have catastrophic implications, and that is something that is part of our overall defence requirement."

I think it’s inevitable that cyberspace and things technological are going to figure more prominently going forward, even over the next ten years, so just as a back drop to the next phase.

Threats to Canadian security, [...] extends beyond the kind of the physical, in terms of waterways or borders, but extends well into the cyber realm, as well. [...] We have both state and non-state actors, acting as our adversaries. [...] We’ve been the target of both state and non-state actors, attacking our various [cyber] networks [...] We need to have a policy response, a well thought out policy response of what that means.

One is digital intelligence, so that you simply have better intelligence about where attacks are coming from. Secondly, monitoring, you need to have better internal monitoring systems. Third, firewalls. And then, fourth, IT security measures, and that includes [...] very simple things like better digital hygiene, because your security is only as good as the weakest link. And if somebody [...] brings in a key and sticks it into a computer, and inadvertently downloads a virus, it doesn’t matter how good your firewalls are. [...] the human element is critical.

I think one of the real problems, and it’s not unique to Canada, but who leads on cyber? In both the narrow and broader defensive security contexts. Because we have a highly distributed governmental apparatus. Public Safety’s involved in cyber, Defence is involved in cyber, other agencies and organizations are involved in cyber: [...] you can buy open source software, and attack [...] banks, infrastructure, because organizations simply haven’t invested sufficiently into what you would call developing very simple capabilities. And that [...] is a problem for governments too, and it’s a problem for our own government.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Today, short of a pandemic, and no doubt in the future, climate change, today, the one thing that can wipe us out pretty quickly, is a non-state actor like ISIS, getting hold of fissile material, plutonium, that sort of thing, and building a crude nuclear device, and deploying it somewhere, particularly somewhere in North America. We simply are not equipped to handle that kind of crisis.

I'm [...] worried about an accidental nuclear war, because there are 15,000 nuclear weapons around the world.

Resurgent Russia, I think is absolutely true, and I think it was the atomic clock that was moved to three minutes before midnight, and it's the first time that has happened since the end of the Cold War. The geo-strategic rivalry in the Asia-Pacific, the biggest arms race that the world has seen [...]
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

ROLE AND PURPOSE OF ALLIANCES

Our alliance defence interests define us; we have commitments to our allies. And those are really at the core of our global peace and security. We have some discretion, obviously, when we go with a coalition, what we choose to do with the UN, but the fact that we are allied is tremendously important, and I just urge us to bear that in mind, especially the piece of the relations with the United States. Information exchange, interoperability, capability, and so on.

I think it’s not a bad question for us to be asking ourselves, every once in a while, how are we playing abroad, but we ought to also ask a different version of that question, which is who understands what we’re doing, and why we’re doing it, and what we need to tell people in order to get them to better understand this.

Think about the full spectrum of the many different kinds of defence and security problems that we work in combination with the United States on, and recognize that rather than there being any kind of centralized mechanism to manage those many different relationships, that there is in fact kind of a mess of different bits and pieces, which are often not very well fit together, and I wouldn’t necessarily bring that up to make a pitch for the building of any kind of new centralized mechanism.

I would say that what we need to do is, for our own national strategic interests, that what we have to take and do, [...] continental defence, is reinforce what we already have. We have a long history with NORAD, we have not done an exceptionally good job [...] ballistic missile defence, and the request by the United States to join Northern Command, which created the bi-national planning group, and I think, given where the Americans are today, and their fear of Mexico, their fear of corruption, [...] we can do a lot more to reinforce our relationship with them, so that they don’t worry about the 49th parallel.

My feeling about NORAD is that it’s so US-dominated, that we wouldn’t want to put a lot of our sovereignty into that, where some of our challenges to our sovereignty are in the Arctic, and from the Americans. And similarly on BMD, I’m worried about the international repercussions of that. This sort of approach to Fortress North America ignores the potential for increasing arms race, and for expenditures on a massive scale on a system that really won’t work. I do think that we have to be on board with the US when they do progressive initiatives."

RELATIONSHIPS WITH STATES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

I think one of the things we have to think about is not simply engagement within the region, but engagement with significant Asian states, such as China, certainly, but also India. Outside the region China is becoming more and more of a participant in international peacekeeping operations. The Canadian military I suspect already informally inter-operates with Chinese Forces off the Horn of Africa. I think if we find ourselves in an upbeat peacekeeping peace operations environment, as perhaps the government is beginning to signal, we will find ourselves then dealing with, and needing to know more about Chinese military, Indian military, and their particular strategy perspectives.

A National Strategy

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATION

[...] it seems to me impossible to discuss defence without discussing foreign policy, and how the two, I suppose, departments will work with each other on dealing with some of these issues that have been raised. Now for me, one of the [...] greatest concerns has been uncertainty that has arisen with state collapse in many parts of the world, but to deal with the issue of state collapse, and to prevent the vacuums that have emerged and allowed some of the non-state actors that others have been talking about to emerge, one needs to engage in serious, in a serious endeavor of state building, of institution building, building bureaucracies, building [...] postal services, building infrastructure, and this seems to me to go far beyond what the traditional mandate of a military has been. It requires a lot of collaboration between units.
I think that the point is, if you look at these issues, these really big issues, they all involve more than just the Department of National Defence. Clearly the Department of National Defence is right at the centre of it, but without the engagement of [...] a Security policy, a Foreign Affairs policy, and those are the departments that are there to support that, it’s going to be pretty hard to make Canadians understand why we’re spending their scarce dollars to combat those things.”

My hope is that there would be harmonization and complementarity between what is created in terms of defence policy, with that of foreign policy, and development policy, so that we can deal with some of the issues [...] alluded to, for example, refugees.

[...] it seems to me impossible to discuss defence without discussing foreign policy, and how the two, I suppose, departments will work with each other on dealing with some of these issues that have been raised. Now for me, one of the [...] greatest concerns has been uncertainty that has arisen with state collapse in many parts of the world, but to deal with the issue of state collapse, and to prevent the vacuums that have emerged and allowed some of the non-state actors that others have been talking about to emerge, one needs to engage in serious, in a serious endeavor of state building, of institution building, building bureaucracies, building [...] postal services, building infrastructure, and this seems to me to go far beyond what the traditional mandate of a military has been. It requires a lot of collaboration between units.”

For nearly ten years, we had an active conversation in Canada about whole government engagement in conflict, whether it be counter-insurgency or broader forms of conflict. It strikes me now that when we expand that conversation to a conversation about terrorism, we’re doing three separate foreign policy reviews, in Public Safety, Defence, and Development. Those sort of core pieces that we spent a decade talking about how we were integrating them in really fundamental ways, inside our policy making process. So I think, in some ways, when we expand our defence conversation into this broader terrorism conversation, it’s difficult to do that without those other pieces of the puzzle as sort of foundational to the conversation.

[...] through a lot of the discussion already, and certainly in the background document that we were all given in advance, there’s been reference again to this sort of whole of government operations, and all of that. [...] and that’s been around for quite a long time, we’ve had mixed success, I think, operationally, mixed results might be a better way of putting it. I don’t have any problem with it when in the domestic environment, I don’t have any problem in recognizing the need for lots of cooperation in regard to identification of threats, where are they coming from, and who are they, and what kinds of people are they, and how do we get at that, and so forth. I’m a little bit more concerned if that leads to a pattern of combined operations in response. Because it seems to me, that’s where we’ve made an awful lot of mistakes internationally, and we could start making them domestically as well. I mean, if you get too crude about trying to intervene in new communities in Canada that you think may be sources of misery, it going to backfire. It’ll backfire for reasons not entirely dissimilar to the reasons it often backfired in Afghanistan, and in other environments, a long list of them now. So I guess what I’m saying is
that we really need to be careful to think, very carefully, about the kinds of instrumentation that you would want to adopt in responding to those threats. They’re all going to be slightly different. And the contributions yet to be made by different departments is going to be quite different. [...] But when you get into the business of changing games, changing cultures, changing precepts, telling people, [...] you have to separate church and state, for example, you can run into backlashes that can be very destructive. So it’s just a kind of warning that, I hear this phrase all the time, it’s hard to make it work for all the usual bureaucratic silo reasons, but even when you make it work, you may find it leads you in directions that may not be tactically very effective.

A National Strategy
MEANING OF SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty today has so many different aspects to it, the protection of data, the protection of capital, market, infrastructure, and that extends not only across Canada, but to our international connections. Trade routes are crucially important, infrastructure around trade. Values that we want to project, and I think the impact of multiculturalism, are also part of our [...] inclusive understanding of what it is to be Canadian and therefore what our sovereignty means.

A National Strategy
PARTNERSHIPS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

I think we have to look at the long-term, in terms of policy, in terms of our strategic direction for defence, and the long-term policy has to also be a partner with industry and trade, and investment into our assets. For instance, the national ship procurement policy is a good one, but you have to have the industrial base to support that policy, to have continuous employment of shipyards and skilled workers to build those ships. Same as any aerospace industry. You have to maintain those skillsets, and the personnel that can do those things, and deliver this equipment to the Canadian Forces, to fulfill our mandates.

Whoever’s going to be at the leading edge of technological advances, whether it’s cyber or something else, is going to be the winners in the future wars. Whether it’s drones or whatever it is. Whoever’s got the best research, wins.
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

A National Strategy
INCREASED COMMUNICATION AND ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PUBLIC

What we find of great concern, is really this decreasing appreciation in the general public of the relevance of defence and security. [...] So, call it lack, or irrelevancy in the modern world. That could be the greatest danger to the Canadian Forces and our other armed and security forces as we progress here. [...] We welcome this event here, and we would hope that there will be a continuing conversation with the public, education of, and feedback from the public, over the years ahead. So that we can see more defence policy statements coming out on out.

I find information is scattered, not orchestrated, and it’s difficult for us to prepare the troops properly if we don’t really know what the needs are, and where we’re going, and also to influence a military culture in Canada. Because at the end of the day, it’s about money and politics, so how to influence the Canadians to understand what the needs are.

A National Strategy
PROCUREMENT CHALLENGES

The elephant in the room for me is defence procurement. [...] It’s absolutely directly tied to recruitment and retention. And, [...] when I look downstream, I am very confident, that before too many years are out, our current government, like all previous governments, will have to move to balance the budget and reduce spending, and defence will be very exposed. So the opportunity for the Government of Canada to move on defence procurement and to simplify this process is absolutely one of the biggest things that’s out there. And lots of people all agree on this, and say yes, yes, yes. The tendency tends to be to layer on another level of committee and put another process layer in, and I think the imperative to simplify this, to look at how the whole of government addresses defence procurement, is an absolutely fundamental and essential for the future for the Armed Forces. If it takes seven years to get out of options analysis, folks, we’re losing a million dollars a day in capability, through lagged project time, then we’re in huge trouble.

When we do procurement, we typically don’t focus enough on innovation to the degree that we should. [...] when we buy ships, we’re focused on building hulls as opposed to the equipment that goes in them.
A National Strategy

PROCUREMENT CHALLENGES

[...] I think that probably the most important dent we can make in improving the Canadian Forces’ future is if we can just figure out how we can fix 5% of the procurement mess. [...] almost every weapon’s program takes forever and as [...] suggests time is money and inflation means that if we delay anything for a few years it means we can buy less of it, everything becomes more costly, part of that is that we have defence protectionism now where you have to buy domestically which is understandable from a political standpoint, but raises problems because we then have to try to have economies of scale and selling these things and to who. And if the answer is to Saudi Arabia, then that is a problem. And so I urge you in your conversations with defence contractors is you can get them out of their sales pitches and just ask them how to fix procurement, because they all have shared experiences of trying to figure out procurement and not so much dithering over the F35 [...] and the super Hornet, but over everything else, the ordinary projects. If we could figure out just a few ways of making it easier to get, maybe not the best equipment in the world, but good equipment that does the job and without, isn’t quite as much bureaucracy. Quite as much red tape. That means that we have to teach the military not to Canadianize every procurement project, that way we always have to add on extra stuff at the end that inflates the cost [...] we could start to do some planning about the consequences of procurement because defence inflation has meant that everything is more expensive than it was before, and so we are not going to buy as many planes this time around, we certainly are not going to get the 15 ships that we were promised. So I would be curious as to whether or not the Navy is doing force planning to figure out exactly how big a navy do we need if we can only afford 8 or 10, or 12 ships or are they not making those decisions because they are hoping someday to get the extra ships. That’s a choice that they may need to be facing directly.

[...] Just perhaps I can put another sort of focus on this whole thing about R&D and the defence industrial base. First of all, the defence industrial base is not the military industrial complex that President Eisenhower spoke of, in a pejorative sense. The defence industrial base is essentially the base of industrial capability in this country, that supports, amongst other things, the defence requirements of the country. The reality is there are probably only two companies in the entire country who make the most of their profit off military equipment, simply because that’s the market that they have. It’s just not big enough. The last government commissioned two reports, the Emerson Report, and the Jenkins Report, that looked at this whole issue fairly extensively, to try and see how could we wring the last amount of bang for the buck, or as my Russian colleagues like to say, rubble for the ruble, out of defence spending. And I think, [...], both of those reports are pretty concise in focusing on the capabilities we have in the country, the amount of research and development effort that we put into it, and what we can get out of it. But, [...], at the end of the day, it’s how much you’re prepared to one, spend on your own Armed Forces, use that industrial capability and that research output on your own Armed Forces, and two, how much you’re prepared to export. [...] But it is true, I think, that the output of our research and development effort across the board, needs to be more focused, and probably more supported by the government.

[...] if we’re talking about prosperity in the country, we’re also talking about the ability to drive innovation, jobs, and other economic prosperities into the country. Which brings me to the point that we firmly believe, as your defence industrial base, that the connection between understanding what the defence industrial base can bring from an economic stability perspective, and how that dovetails into defence capability building, and defence procurement activities, is something that’s critically important for us to start thinking about in this country. And I would add that traditionally, our allies do this much better than we do.
Role, Capacity and Capabilities

GENDER ISSUES

Overcoming gender discrimination and sexual misconduct in the military is actually one really important […] precondition to improving health and mental health and well-being of serving military personnel, and veterans.

I recognize that there’s a lot of good will, but I think there’s just structural reasons that make it hard to recruit more women and visible minorities, if there is a gendered, sexualized military culture that is essentially not welcoming to women. And I guess my final point, and this is not a very important one, but I guess for something to consider in the defence policy review might also be sort of the gender dynamics across the defence teams, so across the civilian and military side of things, right? Because DND actually has good representation of women, I think around 40%, probably in the department. And the Canadian Armed Forces has only 15%, and like, how does that shape the way you work together? How does the defence team work together with that kind of gender dynamics, that might be just something to consider for your review?

« Et puis moi, je suis un peu préoccupée par la mise en œuvre de la résolution 13-25 et les autres, des résolutions de l’ONU qui ont suivi. Et moi ce qui me préoccupe, c’est la façon dont on a créé un jargon d’experts sur le genre et puis qu’on s’est éloigné de la mise en œuvre au quotidien. Pour moi, les questions de genre ce sont des habilités qui s’apprennent, qui se pratiquent et donc du point de vue des Forces armées, il faut trouver une façon qu’on peut intégrer ces notions de genre dans leur travail quotidien. Et que ce soit, on se pose des questions sur comment est-ce que les dynamiques de genre sont dans notre propre organisation, comment sont-elles pertinentes dans notre travail, dans la planification opérationnelle et aussi réfléchir à l’intégration des femmes de façon plus large. Et je pense qu’en ce moment on a tendance à dire bon, c’est soit une question de ressources humaines, équité entre les genres ou c’est une question autre, internationale, on va intégrer une annexe des gens dans nos plans opérationnels. Mais on n’apprend pas aux individus qui font partie des Forces armées de toujours se poser la question de comment est-ce que la variable du genre a un impact dans leurs travaux au jour le jour. Et c’est ça qui manque. »

HEALTH OF CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL

If we’ve got a drone driver sitting there in Antigonish, but they may be effecting, maybe achieving strategic effect in a battlefield in a mid-African country. We’ve got to look at them different. They are operating, they suffer PTSD.

SUPPORTING THE REINTEGRATION OF FORMER CAF MEMBERS

The expansion of the Veteran Transition Program is something also, that is now being offered to veterans, but it’s not offered to the serving members, and serving members sometimes have difficulties in getting the time off to receive that kind of support.

If we put people in harm’s way, I think we have the duty to take care of them afterwards. […] The problem is that when people transition out of the military, they really don’t have anywhere to go, there’s no family doctors that they can be attached to.
**SUPPORTING THE REINTEGRATION OF FORMER CAF MEMBERS**

There are 14 health care systems in Canada. One for each province, one for each territory, and the one for the Armed Forces. Some studies have shown—not some studies, but studies that have been done on it—that in terms of mental health, the Armed Forces system was the best of the 14. I have no difficulty believing that, it is a system that works quite well. Is there room for improvement? Absolutely. But compared to the 13 other systems, it is a system that works extremely well. Especially regarding Operational Stress Injuries—we have acquired some expertise in this and we continue to participate in all research programs that pertain to it. The problem for people who have an Operational Stress Injury or mental health problem is when they leave the Canadian Armed Forces. When they leave the Canadian Armed Forces, in theory, it is assumed they have found a family doctor or a psychiatrist or psychologist, etc. Which is rarely possible to do. Patients literally fall under the provincial health care system. [...] So our problem is when our people leave the Armed Forces, that’s when they find themselves vulnerable in a system that does not always work very well.

**Structure of the Canadian Armed Forces**

**ROLE OF THE RESERVES**

I think a great many of our reservists, primary reservists, supplementary reservists, bring with them and tremendous wealth of skills that they have gathered in their civilian life.

Get out of the historic separations that have in fact stigmatized the reservists, and have created frictions that are often unnecessary, and, in fact, very pejorative to the ability of the reserves to achieve what they want because they’re second best, and they’ll get what we don’t need, and on and on.”

**CAF INTERNATIONAL ROLE**

If we don’t deal with the conflicts, and find a way to lessen them, then the extremism that they engender will come back to haunt us because we live in a global village.

 [...] I think we’ve been talking about capability in terms of just the raw materials, right, [...] men, women, the kind of equipment. But capabilities in terms of the sociological acts, what we can impact as a society, that’s why I like the idea of a peacekeeping or a training centre. It’s not just only bringing them, just to give them the hard skills, but the soft skills as well.

As part of its larger foreign policy, the defence policy - the contribution of the Canadian Forces - has to be to strengthening good governance.

**CAF DOMESTIC ROLE**

I just look at Fort McMurray right now. One of the things we needed to do is figure out, okay, you’ve got satellites to figure out where the fire is going, but a UAV could’ve been sitting up there and helping the provincial authorities to figure out where do they put their assets instead of an airplane, a manned airplane.

Search and rescue – Canada is currently engaged interest the fixed wing search and rescue aircraft replacement project, to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force C-115 Buffalo. Search and rescue is a critical function, and this process needs to be completed quickly.
We’re not spending nearly enough money to buy new technology capital equipment. The biggest impacts for that are going to be on the navy and the air force, because they’re more technologically intensive than the other components of the Armed Forces. I have a lot of concern that we’ll be facing a situation of rust-out again, which we literally ran into with the case of our supply ships.

I think an offensive cyber capability needs to be reframed, and reframed cyber as an enabling capability that supports everything, essentially, that our Canadian Armed Forces do.

The Forces actually do and should be authorized to use cyber offensive tactics. Otherwise, they’re going to be completely disadvantaged in any modern situation into which they go.

We have to be careful that we’re not going to push the world into a world of offensive cyber warfare. We want to create accountability and transparency, and we need that global governance.

We have a culture of complacency here in this country. Right now, we’re spending about 1% of GDP on defence. Australia, which is similarly sized country, 2% of GDP on defence. And nobody’s going to take us seriously; unless we get serious about how we spend our dollars, but also how much we spend.

And I think one of the points that really needs to be made is that defence spending is not a zero sum game, because there is so much expenditure in defence that is equally important for the whole economy, for the country. There is infrastructure, military people are productive members of society, defence industry is productive, has, has, [...], produces good jobs, and so on. So it’s not, if you’re spending for defence, that you’re then taking away from everything else.

I’m going to argue [...] that we should return to NATO, and that is because we have been involved since 1949, we helped write Article 2, we’ve been involved for nearly seventy years. So it doesn’t matter about Kerry and Clinton and Trump, and all those personalities, we have a long standing respect there. [...] We pay our infrastructure on time. These are the typical arguments that are made when you go to Europe, we are respected because of our connection with the Arctic, because of the Atlantic community, because of our history of English and French speaking, and it doesn’t really matter so much about how much we actually pay, because you can calculate it differently. The Americans throw in Israel, they throw in foreign defence spending, we can play the numbers game too, if you want to play that game, about how to calculate it differently. So I totally agree with you, it’s not a numbers game, it’s what you can contribute to where and when it’s needed, and I suppose that should be the exercise very much, of what we’re trying to achieve, what you’re trying to achieve here, is to determine where’s the future problems, and how do we then define what our capacities are, and how we can contribute them, I don’t think we need to be captured by the number. And I think that should be very much what we’re trying to do.
IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Equipment and Capabilities Needs
DEFENCE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP

[...] I do not see the Canada-US relationship in terms of loss of sovereignty for Canada, as we often hear. For me, we gain a lot from the relationship. The benefits to Canada are huge in terms of economic and security gains. And we will always be dependent. We could increase our defence budget to 2% of GDP, and would still remain a mouse next to the elephant. This reality can not fundamentally change—whatever our defence budget, whatever our security budget, and so on—regardless of the political choices we make. So for me, the interest of Canada, the rational interest, is to maximize profits and minimize costs. Does that mean stop spending on defence? No, but it means that increasing our defence spending would bring marginal costs, and costs that would decrease rapidly. [...] There are some who would call that being a “free rider”, but I do not think it is a free rider. We contribute to NORAD, we contribute to other things. It’s not my term, but the term that I like most to describe this approach is to be an “easy rider”. That is to say, we do just enough to maximize our profits while minimizing our costs. That way, we can invest money elsewhere. The 1% of GDP that Canada does not put into defence—or to make it easy, between 1 and 2% of GDP—is put elsewhere. And yet in my assessment, that wouldn’t harm our security, but gives us significant economic gains. So for me, the balance or calibration to be done is there.

IMPORTANCE OF INTEROPERABILITY

The bigger question of interoperability in equipment is a key one, and I would say that the Canadian military, particularly the navy and the air force, their number one priority is to make sure they’ve been totally interoperable with the United States forces.

I think it’s obvious that we need to maintain our alliances. In my view, I’m saying, we have to keep our alliances. The cost to maintain our alliances is to be capable of maintaining interoperability. And that’s expensive. It’s expensive because the technology eventually makes it more and more expensive to maintain a force that is able to operate with the Americans. Because for them, technology is a part of their way of life, they change it on a regular basis. So that cost, I’m saying, will always be there, to maintain that interoperability, and it’s a matter of looking after our communication systems.
5.0 THE CONSULTATION PROCESS

DND’s consultation process is best defined by the different audiences involved in this process. Ipsos worked with DND on the In-Person Roundtable Meetings and the Online Public Consultations; however, DND also conducted its own roundtable events on specific issues, engaged with Parliament, allies and partners as well as appointed a Ministerial Advisory Panel. Feedback from each of these consultation exercises will inform Canada’s National Defence Policy.

Taking Part in the Consultation
Canadians were invited to take part in the discussion online through the Engagement portal as well as through social media. The results of this feedback are summarized under separate cover.

The roundtables were held in seven cities across Canada and included 95 defence policy experts and stakeholders from a variety of fields.

Each session was governed by the Chatham House Rule: while participants were instructed not to discuss the opinions of others expressed within the in-camera sessions, they were permitted to express their own. The results of these discussions have been reported in aggregate with no attribution to ensure the anonymity of participants.

Bespoke responses Submissions were also received as bespoke written comments from the public via letter, email and other means. The submissions are reported within the Public Consultations Report, under separate cover.
Audiences - Definition of defence experts

Roundtable participants (15 to 20 per event) were asked to attend the session by invitation only and included:

- Minister of National Defence;
- Members of the Minister’s Advisory Panel;
- Media commentators / opinion leaders;
- Academics;
- Members of Parliament;
- Defence industry experts; and,
- Other appropriate defence experts.

The consultation paper was sent to participants in advance and an agenda was shared on the day of the event to ensure that all of the relevant issues were discussed and commented on during the course of the session. They were also asked to submit an opinion paper prior to the session for review by the Ministerial representative. These opinion papers were posted on DND’s Defence Policy Review site and are available to the public at:


Definition of general public contributors

Canadians were invited to take part in the discussion online through the Engagement portal as well as through social media, and bespoke responses.

Bespoke responses coming from defence industry companies were shared separately with DND for review and inclusion in their internal analysis.

Contributors had varying levels of familiarity with DND and Canadian defence policy. They ranged from the average Canadian, to experts, stakeholders and industry members with an interest in defence policy. DND welcomed contributions from current and former members of the CAF.

These submissions have been incorporated into the Public Consultations Report, under separate cover.

Event Details and Timing

The Minister of National Defence was present at four of the seven sessions and had other Government representatives present at those he was unable to attend himself. These included the Hon. Kent Hehr, Minister of Veterans’ Affairs and the Hon. John McKay, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence.

DND was responsible for the invitation list and recruitment of participants for the events. DND Policy and Public Affairs representatives were on hand to listen to feedback and provide additional context as needed.

Session proceedings were retransmitted via conference call to allow departmental officials not physically present to listen to session proceedings. Participants were offered the option to have simultaneous translation at all locations, if desired, using a headset and transmission device.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Ipsos Facilitator</th>
<th>Government Representative</th>
<th>Advisory Panel Members Present</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>April 27, 2016</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Darrell Bricker, CEO Ipsos Global Public Affairs</td>
<td>The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>Two members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>May 20, 2016</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Darrell Bricker, CEO Ipsos Global Public Affairs</td>
<td>The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>Three members</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yellowknife</td>
<td>May 24, 2016</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mike Colledge, President Ipsos Public Affairs Canada</td>
<td>The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>One member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>June 4, 2016</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mike Colledge, President Ipsos Public Affairs Canada</td>
<td>The Hon. Kent Hehr, Minister of Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>One member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>June 27, 2016</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Sébastien Dallaire, Vice-President Ipsos Public Affairs Canada</td>
<td>The Hon. John McKay, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>Two members</td>
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<td>Halifax</td>
<td>June 28, 2016</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Darrell Bricker, CEO Ipsos Global Public Affairs</td>
<td>The Hon. John McKay, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence</td>
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<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>July 6, 2016</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Mike Colledge, President Canadian Public Affairs</td>
<td>The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence</td>
<td>One member</td>
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</table>

The event logistics for Vancouver, Toronto, Edmonton, Montreal and Halifax were organized by the Ipsos Event Coordinator. This included audio-visual contracting, simultaneous translation in each venue, catering and facility rental. Refreshments and a light lunch were provided to participants during these full-day sessions. DND organized logistics for the Yellowknife and Ottawa sessions.

In addition to a dedicated Ipsos note-taker, where possible, sessions were recorded and transcripts made in order to assist with reporting and analysis of the discussions. DND also provided a note-taker from ADM Policy at each session to ensure that the Policy team also had a clear understanding of the events.
The sessions consisted of day-long discussions in which participants were invited to provide their views and perspectives on three broad themes related to the ongoing 2016 Defence Policy Review, namely:

- Challenges to Canada’s security;
- The Canadian Armed Forces’ role in addressing threats and challenges; and
- Defence capabilities and the future of the Canadian Armed Forces.

**Roundtable Discussions (Vancouver, Toronto, Yellowknife, Edmonton, Montreal, Halifax)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 am</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>11:10 am</td>
<td>Setting the Stage – Minister of National Defence / Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Roundtable Proceedings</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>11:20 am</td>
<td>Challenges to Canada’s Security:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Defending Canada and North America</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Global Peace and Security</td>
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<td>1:00 pm</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
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<td>1:45 pm</td>
<td>CAF Role in Addressing Threats and Challenges:</td>
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<td>Vision for the Canadian Armed Forces going forward</td>
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<td>• in Canada;</td>
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<td>• in North America; and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Internationally.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:00 pm</td>
<td>Health Break</td>
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<tr>
<td>3:20 pm</td>
<td>Defence Capabilities and Future of the force:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Status quo vs. more targeted approach</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Future of the CAF (Size, Structure, Composition)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Personnel (Health and Wellness)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4:50 pm</td>
<td>Closing Remarks</td>
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# Procurement Roundtable Discussions (Ottawa)

### Introduction
11:00 am

### Setting the Stage – Minister of National Defence
11:10 am

### Roundtable Proceedings

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Time</th>
<th>Session</th>
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</table>
| 11:20 am to 1:00 pm | **Challenges Associated with Promoting a Competitive and Innovative Environment:**  
Tapping into homegrown intellectual capabilities to benefit Defence needs;  
- Academia, veterans etc.…  
- How private sector innovation can/should benefit DND;  
- Cyber, unmanned systems, space,  
- Alignment of private sector and academia R&D with Government needs  
- Barriers to industrial capabilities readiness to meet future DND need  
Barriers to innovation/international competitiveness. |
| 1:00 pm to 1:45 pm | **Lunch Break**                                                                             |
| 1:45 pm to 3:00 pm | **Improving Procurement:**  
- Specific measures needed to improve procurement process,  
- Need for/interest in risk sharing between Government and the private sector,  
- Industry’s role in assisting in DND operational capability development. |
| 3:00 pm to 3:20 pm | **Health Break**                                                                            |
| 3:20 pm to 4:50 pm | **Defence spending as an economic driver:**  
- Defence procurement an economic benefit for all for Canadians;  
- Strengths of the Canadian defence industry,  
- Key criteria for identifying strategic industrial capabilities. |
| 4:50 pm to 5:00 pm | **Closing Remarks**                                                                        |
# ROUNDTABLE Sessions

**Vancouver**
Date held: April 27, 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons</td>
<td>Founder and President, The Simons Foundation</td>
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Key Take-Aways

- Security is not just the responsibility of the CAF but must adopt a whole-of-government approach.
- Our biggest threats are climate change, cyber security and social and economic instability both at home and around the world.
- There is a need for an integrated strategy (U.S. and across all relevant government departments) that addresses security not just in a military vacuum but in the context of complex social and economic issues that contribute significantly to current and future threats.
- This strategy and the CAF’s ongoing activities need to be clearly communicated to the public who need to be engaged in meaningful dialogue and consultation on these issues.
- We need to focus on our troops (both CAF and Reservists) to ensure capacity for the future through improved conditions during active duty and retirement and increased recruitment efforts.
- We need to focus on our relationship with the U.S. as partners both in BMD (either through surveillance support or potentially a more active role) and in improving interoperability.
- We have a role to play in contributing to economic and social stability around the world through training and hands-on support and education.
- Our procurement processes are cumbersome and lengthy and need to be streamlined to ensure we are equipped with the most modern technology on the market.
- Nuclear proliferation did not emerge as a major theme.
- Terrorism was discussed on the periphery and then only in more detail once prompted by the facilitator.

Climate Change and the North

- The increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters is an increasing threat for which Canada needs to be prepared. There was discussion about the extent to which this is the military’s responsibility, with some suggesting that this should fall under the military’s purview and citing the effectiveness of past interventions; others feel this is a shared responsibility with Public Safety.
- Regarding the security environment in the North, access, traffic and our ability to react is very limited – north of 60 gets forgotten by the rest of Canada and is a growing concern. According to some, there is a need to build capacity to react with a focus on infrastructure.
- Others suggested that the North is not a defence responsibility – remote surveillance, infrastructure, community infrastructure, north of 60 communications – are not a defence domain. They suggest that the military is tasked with these because of perceived big defence budgets. These responsibilities cannot be tackled comprehensively without impacting other key defence responsibilities.
- There is a need to work with First Nations, building stronger capacity and supporting infrastructure to support stable communities that are more prepared to confront security threats.

Economic Stability and Global Governance

- Several reflected on an apparent increase in global disorder, interstate conflict and social instability. These are seen as often being the result of economic disparity and lack of stable and effective governance in other areas of the world.
- Several suggested that tackling economic stability at home and focusing on improving governance elsewhere will help to minimize these threats from instability.

Cyber security

- Some identified a need to focus on recruiting and retaining top cyber security talent and investing in research.
- From a health perspective, there was some concern over the lack of preparedness, research and understanding of super bugs and other biological threats.
• In the context of the war on terrorism, it was noted that there is a disintegration of the distinction between domestic and international conflict/threat – strategies designed to deal with international conflict/threat are increasingly being implemented domestically.
• Some expressed concern over accountability as new capabilities are developed. States and corporations are developing capabilities/equipment to combat negative actors, resulting in a need for strong cyber security policies and clear accountability.

Role of Peacekeeping
• This theme sparked significant debate. There was agreement among several participants that we need to debunk the “myth” of Canadian peacekeeping; peacekeeping is no longer simply the delivery of humanitarian aid. These participants suggested a move away from peacekeeping to expeditionary missions and peace-making.
• Others said that peacekeeping is increasingly done in the developing world and our focus should shift to other partners (e.g., the African Union) rather than continuing with a UN-centric approach.

Distance between Canadians and the Military
• There was agreement that while Canadians are generally proud of the CAF, there is a lack of understanding of the role it plays, as well as the country’s overall defence strategy.
• Many expressed concern over the lack of communication with Canadians on defence issues, identifying a need to translate and communicate issues in a way Canadians can understand because they ultimately drive foreign policy.
• One participant posited that a key challenge of this review will be to convince Canadians that we need renewal of our armed forces and increased funding to ensure that they can meet their various missions.

Ballistic Missile Defence
• For some, BMD is an opportunity to combine arctic and missile defence (e.g., North Warning System coming to the end of its life). It should be a big issue on the defence agenda – to add our space-based assets and surveillance capacity given relatively low cost participation – in northern Canada it is an opportunity.
• Some suggested that Canada should not participate actively in investing in the development of BMD but continue surveillance activities and participation in NORAD, stating that missile defence is costly and its success unproven. They say that it would be a waste of Canada’s time and money, and potentially internationally destabilizing.
• More specifically, some suggested that the U.S. could be very open to an offer of additional personnel to staff missile defence systems. They indicated that we could staff missile defence systems very well and that Canada offers a lot of additional coverage through our vast geography.

Defence Capabilities And The Future Of The Force People
CAF Personnel
• According to some participants, there is a need for more effective recruiting. This goes beyond recruitment campaigns, though there is work to be done in this respect. This included improvements to the experience of working for the armed forces, including: better pay and supports for active duty; and better treatment for wounded soldiers and veterans (from injuries to mental health).
• There was some debate over the need to increase the number of flag and General officers: some say this would be beneficial – Canada would have a stronger voice at the table when working with our partners, while others point out risks. The primary risk is that establishing flag and General officers outside of the functional structures of the military can lead to the creation of substructures to support them that draw focus and resources from strategic priorities.
• The military today needs to attract the best educated personnel and shed its reputation among some as being “the only way out of poverty.” There is a need to improve the offering/rebrand to make a career in the CAF a “first choice” option and not a fallback position. This can be achieved by emphasizing the positive outcomes and long-term career prospects beyond military service.
• According to participants, there is a need to look at
pay and conditions — seen as more important than equipment.
- Some participants say the CAF must develop a new recruitment tool/strategy, and must ensure that it reflects demographic change and the community at large, including new Canadians.
- Some commented that visual presence in major cities is virtually non-existent. There is a need to increase knowledge and visibility among the general public to bolster the value proposition of serving in the CAF.

**Reserves**
There was significant discussion regarding re-rolling the Reserves.
- It was suggested that there are two key areas of focus for the Reserves: they should be re-structured and their number increased.
- One suggestion was to set them up as a communications and coordination hub for disaster relief.
- Several also raised the need to improve conditions of Reservists by making it easier to transition back to work. Challenges related to retention of intellectual property were also mentioned.
- Also raised were high attrition rates and the need to improve recruitment.

**Tools and Processes**

**Relationship with the U.S.:**

**NORAD, interoperability**
- Interoperability is key and is a significant challenge not just for CAF but around the world due to the lack of compatibility between the increasing diversity of systems being put in place.
- NORAD is seen as a good start: we don’t lose our sovereignty, keep our independence but still have an impact – good model to pursue.

**Procurement**
- There is a need to streamline procurement. The process is too lengthy and inefficient, restricting our ability to be flexible, lean and nimble.
- There is a need to develop a broader strategy including consultation with industry to ensure that there is a sufficient industrial base to support procurement needs. This discussion was framed within the context of defence R&D often being the impetus for innovative thinking and therefore collaboration with other departments. Some felt industry would allow for greater value to be created in an environment of limited budgets.
- There was extensive discussion about looking at new ways of rethinking old approaches to defending Canada by maximizing opportunities created by technological advancements.

**A long-term plan for the CAF**
- There was some discussion acknowledging a need for concrete long-term planning for the CAF. One participant summarized the discussion of this topic by pointing to a need for knowledge of long-term funding so key decisions related to equipment and personnel can be made.
- They noted that DND has not been as present across the country in the area of developing the human knowledge capacity to drive, operate and analyze. The group discussed three forms of human knowledge capacity building:
  1. Greater emphasis on education
  2. In-house capability
  3. Greater leveraging of national networks – social sciences, etc.

**Full-Spectrum Capability or Specialized Forces?**
- There was disagreement on this front. Some say that specialized forces and intervention are the right role for Canada to play, focusing on training, governance and “gap-filling.” Others say that full-spectrum capability is essential.
- One participant commented that the idea of specializing is a cover story for saving money.
- It was suggested that our current state of peace and stability has allowed several defence capabilities to “atrophy”, resulting in an inability to defend ourselves both at home and abroad should the security climate change.
- Some suggested that maintaining full-spectrum capability is essential to our role in supporting stability elsewhere through effective training. It also allows us to supplement efforts by others providing us with important capital in international relations. There is a market of exchange for military capability. If we specialize that currency becomes diminished.
List of Participants

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Key Take-Aways

- Security is not just the responsibility of the CAF but must adopt a whole-of-government approach.
- Our biggest threats are climate change, cyber security, the return of geopolitics and the rise of non-state actors and ungoverned spaces.
- There is a need for an integrated strategy (U.S. and across all relevant government departments) that addresses security not just in a military vacuum but in the context of complex social and economic issues that contribute significantly to current and future threats.
- This strategy and the CAF’s ongoing activities need to be clearly communicated to the public who need to be engaged in meaningful dialogue and consultation on these issues.
- We need to focus on our troops (both CAF and Reservists) to ensure capacity for the future by better leveraging the skillsets of civilians and retraining returning troops.
- We need to focus on our relationship with the U.S. as partners both in BMD (either through surveillance support or a more active role) and defence overall to ensure lasting positive economic relations.
- Our procurement processes are cumbersome and lengthy and need to be streamlined to ensure we are equipped with the most modern technology on the market.
- Canada is uniquely positioned to play an important role in peacekeeping, state building and conflict prevention.
**Threats to Canada’s Security**

Several broad themes emerged consistently:

**Governance and Culture**

Non-State Actors and Ungoverned Spaces

- Most participants identified the increasing development of ungoverned spaces as presenting more opportunity for non-state actors to act as a significant threat to Canada’s security. They pointed to the erosion of the rule of law and the trend of non-state actors seeking legitimacy by being compliant with law.
- Some expressed concern that we are currently only dealing with the symptoms (terrorism, disease, refugees fleeing from conflict in these spaces) of this issue and not the cause, calling for harmonization of foreign, defence and development policy to tackle the cause.
- Several argued that, in the context of an increasingly complex transnational network that includes non-state actors and ungoverned spaces, defence, economic and foreign and development policy must be looked at in tandem due to growing interdependencies.
- Many argued that in this environment, we need to think about sovereignty and governance differently. We need to focus on building relationships with the governance structures in place (e.g., regions, traditional structures or zones) rather than focusing on states.

**Geopolitics**

- There was significant discussion about the return of geopolitics and geostrategic rivalries. Notably, participants articulated the challenge of balancing geo-strategic and non-state actors in a new context where traditional approaches are no longer effective.
- Major players of concern are Russia and China, with many noting that these actors pose significantly different threats than they did in the past.
- Some expressed concern over nuclear proliferation and an accidental nuclear incident.
- Several also suggested that we are ill-suited to defend ourselves now and into the future against the threat of Russia because the nature of our relationship with them has changed as well as their acquisition of sophisticated technology. One participant noted that the atomic clock is at 3-minutes to midnight for the first time since the Cold War.
- Several pointed to the need to engage with China through trade and investment policies, stating that they have made it clear that security, trade and economics are two sides of the same coin.
- There was also discussion of the dependence on foreign markets. We produce far more than we can consume at home and therefore need to maintain foreign markets to sustain our standard of living and contribute to other parts of the world.
  - One participant said that defence spending is not a zero sum game – it can include spending on infrastructure, personnel (creating productive members of society), investment in industry producing good jobs, etc.

**Sovereignty**

- Several participants expressed concern over the review, focusing on too narrow a definition of sovereignty and noting that sovereignty is linked to many different aspects (e.g., protection of data, capital, markets, infrastructure – across borders – trade routes). They noted that the values that we want to protect are also part of our inclusive understanding of what it means to be Canadian and our sovereignty.
- Some noted that Canadians expect that the primary role of National Defence is to protect our sovereignty from coast to coast but noted that there is also an expectation that we are part of global “sheriff’s posse” with a mandate of state-building. These participants said that those who used to lead on this front no longer want to take on this role and are increasingly leading from behind. They expressed concern that we no longer see coalitions of the “likeminded and fair-minded” cropping up to do this.

**Complacency**

- Several participants raised the issue of Canada’s complacency on defence. Some suggested that there is culture of complacency around spending, citing our current spending of 1% of GDP on defence, comparing our spend with Australia’s at 2%. These participants are concerned that Canada will not be taken seriously if it doesn’t increase its defence spending, noting that this will be difficult to “sell” to Canadians who are equally complacent about de-
• One participant raised concern over complacency at home about the potential of conflict arising from ethnic cleavage.

Climate Change and the North
• For many, the North is seen as poorly defended. This has implications for security across a range of sectors:
  • Russia is dumping rocket fuel out of its rockets which ends up in the Arctic waters.
  • How do we regulate potential shipping corridor?
  • Climate change – a threat multiplier in fragile states – is also a source of natural disasters requiring military response both domestically and internationally.
• Again the theme of the interconnectedness between multiple policy areas was raised. Some spoke of the fact that the paradigm of the past 50 years (the military silo) has changed and that the silo has disappeared. They urged participants to look at review in a much broader context, underlining that while DND is a small player on climate change, it is a very significant player.

Cyber security and Technology
• There was extensive discussion and debate over cyber security. The discussion extended beyond military threats to financial systems and other important infrastructure systems can undermine our economy with catastrophic consequences.
• Also noted was the “information explosion” and its impact on Canadian military and partners. The immediacy of and near universal access to information and increased access to low cost global communications creates an environment of new and different threats. We need to ensure that Canada is not disadvantaged on this front. Furthermore, the ‘Internet of Things’ means that an increasing number of things that we depend on for daily functioning and survival are dependent on the Internet leaving us more vulnerable.
• Another participant pointed to the fact that the cyber world transcends all borders and Canada needs to articulate its position in that world. How might we try to preclude the evolution of certain categories of weapons that could be deeply damaging?
• Using the analogy of the common cold, one participant suggested that while we need to focus on prevention, it is unrealistic to think we can protect ourselves fully. The real challenge is how quickly we can recover. This participant called for a policy of “deterrence by denial” and outlined critical measures to consider:
  • Digital intelligence: where do attacks come from? Need for increased internal monitoring, firewalls, IT security measures, etc.
  • Better digital hygiene: security only as good as the weakest link. Need to think about resilience – not just ours but mutual resilience with our partners – assist counterparts to have better systems so they don’t become the weakest link.
  • Deterrence by denial: Raise the cost for the attacker so that they think twice before attacking you. Make it tougher for them to attack you.
• Several identified the need to look at cyber in a broader context – healthcare, the financial sector, critical infrastructure, etc. They argued that given the implications across all sectors cyber should be tackled through collaboration between all federal government departments and with non-governmental organizations and the private sector. One participant called for building linkages between the private sector and education – creating incubators for innovation.
• There were mixed views with regard to offensive versus defensive cyber security measures.
  • Many pointed to the international political dimension of the issue, cautioning that offensive measures could encourage the development of cyberwarfare and noting that pre-emptive measures can lead to escalation in physical spaces. One participant called for the creation of an international body to police cyberwarfare, gathering evidence and holding actors accountable.
  • In this same vein, one participant advised that any discussion about more robust cyber security needs to give reference to evolving norms; deterrence by denial is better than just deterrence.
  • One participant noted that, in the operation of a mission, we must and currently do use offensive tactics out of necessity.
  • Several participants who support offensive tac-
tics cautioned that it will be challenging to get public support, with one participant saying it is incumbent on the government to "sell" offensive approaches to Canadians.

One participant, who supported the use of some offensive tactics, namely gaming to learn about vulnerabilities, pointed out that there is an opportunity cost to focusing too much on offensive approaches and cautioning that, the more you spend on offence, the less you have to spend on deterrence by denial.

In the context of the discussion on cyber security, both drones and nuclear weapons were raised as significant threats.

U.S.-Canada Relations

- For several participants, the key is to ensure that the U.S. feels “comfortable enough” with how we are behaving on the world’s stage so that they continue to do business with us. One participant said that the biggest threat we face is a lock-down of the Canada/U.S. border.
- In line with previous comments about “Canadian complacency,” one participant referred to the Canadian malaise versus American entrepreneurialism, stating that the U.S. is increasingly concerned over defence while Canadians still have a belief that things have not changed here.
- One participant pointed to U.S. disengagement, particularly from dealing with the rise of non-state actors and ungoverned spaces as a threat. They suggested that the realities on the ground far outstrip their capabilities, meaning that we can no longer rely so heavily on the U.S. to lead on these issues. They called for Canada to increase the size of the military.

Role of the CAF

Structure of the Forces

- There was extensive discussion about the structure of the forces. Key issues raised included:
  - The structure of the forces is too tribal (army, air force, navy). We need to work as a “Team Canada” but we come together too late at the top. There was a call for better integration of air, sea and land during training and planning. Some suggested this was because funding drives this silo structure and called for change. They cautioned that this will be culturally challenging inside the forces with ramifications for procurement and administration. We need to start with the political objective and work back based on need.
  - The importance of developing relationships with civilian spheres including policy minded scholars investing in university centres – used to be a network of security defence forums thinking on these very issues on an ongoing basis. Useful to reinvest in that – ongoing dialogue with civilians.
  - Rebalancing in the existing core structure over the last few years. Current funding doesn’t allow for new investments or a rebalancing.
  - Cyber paradigm – need to engage millennials. Current structure has a hard time dealing with them. We need to employ those millennials to do the things they are adept at and that the CAF is not. Need to have a solid plan where the CAF can engage with younger civilians to draw on the skillsets we need. Clear plan of engagement between CAF and Canadians.
  - We are lagging behind our allies. We are not currently equipped with the capabilities we need to address today’s context. We are hamstrung with the structure we have right now and we are not developing capacity quickly enough.

The Reserves

- Many agreed that we need to look differently at how we deploy our Reserves – based on physical characteristics and not mental capacity. They are an underutilized labour pool.
- One participant offered the example of cyber security. The skills required in that domain could better be addressed by looking for the right people and getting them into the Reserves rather than training regular forces. Almost all of the NORAD brass are Reservists of some kind. The skillset required and investment in teaching the members of NORAD means they can’t afford to have them leave every three years.
- Several also pointed to a need for civilian deployability in Canada (perhaps a “Canada Corp”). There is a need to create career pathways, more interaction with regular forces. They can do monitoring, nation building, monitoring court-cases – beyond joint to actually being a “Team Canada.”
• It currently takes a year to get into the Reserves. Some suggest a need to rethink how we go about determining skills required rather than simply focusing on recruiting young people and then “moving them along.”
• Many discussed the need for a dedicated foreign intelligence capacity to better understand threats to be able to manage them. While many agreed that we are good at collection, there was also a general agreement that we are weak at analysis. This was noted as a characteristic not just of government but of private and other public sector organizations in Canada.
• There was general consensus that Canada lacks a strong and vibrant policy thinktank culture/community. There were strong calls for an ongoing commitment to developing stronger analytic capabilities.

Conflict Prevention through Peacekeeping and State Building
• In discussing the role of CAF in addressing these threats and challenges, there was a general consensus that Canada’s role should focus on conflict prevention through peacekeeping and state-building. An often stated rationale for this view is that Canada does not have the same historical “baggage” of imperialism and colonialism as Europe, with the U.S. offering what is perceived as a more neutral perspective.
• With the previously noted rise in ungoverned territory and non-state actors, emphasis was put on Canada’s role in preventing conflict in these areas.
• Referencing the UN convention deployment force in Macedonia as a good example of Canada’s effectiveness in these areas, one participant called for doing more preventative work in areas where conflict is imminent.
• Two key challenges were raised:
  ○ the abundance of places where the potential for escalation makes it difficult to determine where Canada should act; and,
  ○ The success of this kind of work is difficult to measure making it challenging to demonstrate progress.
• While some argued that, in an environment that increasingly includes non-state actors we should not depend too heavily on NATO and the UN and that we should look at the regional forces in place (e.g., the African Union, Asia-Pacific, etc.). Others emphasized that we should return to NATO because we have been involved for 70 years, noting that we were instrumental in the drafting of Article II. Some suggested that we should take a strong stand at NATO and leverage our positioning as neutral to raise questions about deterrence. They view NATO as one of the best command and control functions available.
• There was debate over whether Canada should conduct state-building by imposing democratic institutions in conflict areas.
• The key challenge identified with this approach was that most of these areas are rife with corruption, making it difficult for democratic institutions to function and for democratic values to be established.
  ○ Some argued that corruption must first be eliminated before installing democratic institutions, warning that working with the actors in place can result in institutionalizing the corruption.
  ○ Others contended that corruption is eroded over time and good governance takes over.
One participant spoke of the experience in Syria where as a long-time authoritarian state there was significant resistance to democracy across the political spectrum, suggesting that the goal should be finding an institution that is tailored to local needs. With regard to peacekeeping, most agreed that, overall, it has been successful, although many noted a gap in training.
  ○ Several pointed to the fact that we are still training people in silos – military, police and civilians. When they leave on missions they are often meeting for the first time in a mission area. It was proposed that we should consider integrated training solutions so that when they deploy they have already established a working relationship.

Defence Capabilities and the Future of the Force

NORAD
• Some suggested extending NORAD to maritime defence while others said that NORAD has already gone into the maritime area.
• While most agree that NORAD is an effective instrument, some warn that we should not “put too much stock in it” because it is dominated by the U.S. and
thus poses a threat to our sovereignty. There is a need for more cooperation and collaboration but not through that one mechanism.

- Some called for Canada to revisit the issue of protection and deterrence – not weaponization but dialogue with the U.S about deterring the threat of Russia in the North. NORAD’s activity is mainly surveillance. What we need for continental defence is what we need for expeditionary matters. It wouldn’t be duplicating just something apportioned differently.
  - Ballistic Missile Defence
  - Several participants took the position that we should be more active on BMD and that our lack of participation has negatively impacted the Americans’ perception of us. For them, the perception of what we are doing is what really matters.
  - One participant opposed further participation for fear that it may provoke Russia which opposes it.
  - Another proposed working collaboratively with the U.S. through additional surveillance on coastal approaches and the North.
  - There was debate over the manning of NORAD, with some suggesting we don’t need to match the U.S. presence and should rather “get out of their way,” while others pushed for equal presence to ensure an equal voice.

Mexico
  - A participant questioned whether Canada should expand the North American relationship to include Mexico? Debate over this issue raised the following questions and thoughts:
    - If the dominant rhetoric is that borders are unsecure (Mexico) that has an impact on us. Mexico is also on track to be a more major trading partner with the U.S. than Canada (due to faster growth rates).
    - Working with Mexican defence officials to make their borders strong reinforces the sense that our borders are strong.
    - The Mexicans will never be allowed in Northcom. Northcom needs to be reinforced as an interagency organization.
    - Some suggested that Canada would be a better partner than the U.S. in strengthening the rule of law in Mexico through community policing mod-

els. The RCMP is currently conducting some training there but it could be ramped up.
  - One participant called for a partnership with Mexico on trans-border issues like cyber security and energy infrastructure.
  - Another suggested that Canada can temper what Mexico sees as an asymmetrical relationship with the Americans. Mexico may replace Canada as the U.S.’s most important trade partner and they are our third most important trading partner right now.

Capabilities
  - There was general agreement that capabilities have to be judged based on the policy objectives. If conflict prevention is a primary policy objective then we need capabilities for state-building (e.g., bureaucracy building, postal services, infrastructure). Currently, we are limited in our ability to rely the Forces to achieve these objectives.
  - One capability that we have currently is the ability to train other forces and enhance stability in other countries. We should consider peacekeeping training centres in Canada.
  - The issue of how we deal with returning troops was raised. There was discussion about investing in retraining with one participant suggesting that we could consider using engineers at RMC to teach returning troops.
  - Many called for more efficient human resources management, noting that it less expensive to invest in our people than buying new equipment.
  - There was also extensive discussion of the role of the Reserves. There were calls for a civilian roster (skills database) that can enhance our ability to leverage the full spectrum of their skillsets and provide a career path for them.
  - Data management is critical to not only how we conduct operations but as we move into a world of self-learning and self-operating machines, there is going to be a premium on how we use data and exploit it. Canada can be a leader in this space.

Procurement
  - Many called for further procurement of UAVs as well as more innovative uses. For example, they can be used in the Arctic for surveillance, to survey fires or for humanitarian aid. However, several cautioned
that U.S. hits in Pakistan are increasingly hitting low-ranking operatives (civilians) and we need to manage that risk.

• There was general agreement that procurement processes are too slow – procurement often taking decades while technology is on a three-month cycle. They pointed to a need to develop capacity to quickly acquire new technologies.

• One participant suggested that we create an institution within DND that deals with technology and supports the whole organization. In response, some cautioned that the CAF is not large enough to require that level of report and that we would risk creating another silo within the organization. They favour engaging business leaders to advise on technology investments and ways to ensure current assets are being used to the fullest potential.

• There was some discussion of whether there should be a Canadian content policy in place for DND procurement. Some agreed that this would be good for the economy and the industrial base, while others preferred focusing on procuring the right equipment at the right price regardless of where it is made.

  ° They cautioned that requiring DND to purchase only Canadian-made goods could create an artificial market that couldn’t be sustained by DND spending.

  ° However, one participant suggested that Canada could make it easier for Canadian companies to do business with the Canadian government, stating that it is more challenging to work with the Government of Canada compared to any other country in the world. They also said that the Government of Canada seems to have a negative perception of “Made in Canada” and that that needs to be addressed.

**Funding**

• Some argued that, in the current budget envelope, we are not spending enough on capital investments and called for more long-term funding.

• However, most agreed that the amount of spending was not necessarily the issue; rather we have to ensure that we are spending in a meaningful way.

• Most agreed that should we increase spending on defence, we will first need to focus on informing the public about what the CAF does and why through a commitment to an ongoing dialogue to garner public support.
Yellowknife
Date held: May 24, 2016

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**Key Take-Aways**

- Security is not just the responsibility of the CAF but must adopt a whole-of-government approach.
- Our biggest threats are climate change, cyber security, the return of geopolitics and the rise of non-state actors and ungoverned spaces.
- As traffic increases in the north, arctic sovereignty and security (including the environment) should be key areas of focus.
- The CAF’s ongoing activities need to be clearly communicated to the public who need to be engaged in meaningful dialogue and consultation on these issues.
- We need to focus on our troops (both CAF and Reservists) to ensure capacity for the future by better leveraging the skillsets of civilians and retraining returning troops.
- We need to focus on our relationship with the U.S. as partners both in BMD (either through surveillance support or a more active role) and defence overall to ensure lasting positive economic relations.
- Our procurement processes are cumbersome and lengthy, and need to be streamlined to ensure that we are equipped with the most modern technology on the market.
- Canada is uniquely positioned to play an important role in peacekeeping, state building and conflict prevention.

**Threats To Canada’s Security**

**The Arctic**

- Perhaps not surprisingly, much of the discussion in Yellowknife evolved in the context of a northern perspective. As such, the Arctic did not emerge as one central issue. Instead, threats and challenges were discussed in terms of the implications for northern Canada.

**Increased Access and Activity**

- Increased access to and activity in the North, primarily driven by climate change, but also by technology presents significant threats to the environment, our security and our sovereignty.

**Environment**

- Climate change emerged as a pressing concern for all participants. The primary concerns in this regard were:
- Changes resulting from global warming are increasing access to and activity in the Arctic, which in turn is increasing the amount of pollution in the area. This is a threat to both the local environment and coast-
line communities.
• Specifically, concern was expressed over increased traffic in the Northwest Passage as well as policing and managing the fishing industry, particularly in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

Security of the North
• From a security standpoint, there was a thorough discussion of controlling foreign access to our territory in the North.
• There was concern expressed over ensuring that we not only have sufficient surveillance in place but also the ability to act in the case of a breach or conflict. Some recommended partnering with other jurisdictions to ensure sufficient defense capability.
• An assertive Russia that is increasingly resorting to military action is seen as a serious threat.
• One participant cautioned that, while the Arctic may currently be a nexus, it is not the driving force. There are larger strategic challenges like terrorism and rogue states such as North Korea that are driving the threat and need to be dealt with in a broader context.
• Another raised the issue of how the changing dynamics of surface warfare have implications for defense in the North. More specifically, they pointed to Russia as a long-term potential threat as geopolitics evolve, particularly in combination with China. There is a dynamic of Sino-Russian cooperation in the North (symbolic visits, financial arrangements, oil and gas arrangements) that presents a strong potential for threats that we may not be in a position to anticipate.
• One participant suggested that if China’s new nuclear powered submarines have an ice capability, it will present a clear threat.
• Our growing reliance on technology and broadband makes us vulnerable to the increased frequency of extreme weather events, making cyber security a focus.

Sovereignty
• Increased access and activity in the North were also seen by most as a threat to our sovereignty. Several suggested a need to partner with communities and invest in infrastructure that allows people to stay there. Investment in the North was not seen by these participants to be about defending against others but as reinforcing the communities there – by supporting them and building these communities, we inherently solidify our sovereignty.
• While some raised the issue of China as a threat (due to their development of super icebreakers), others argued that China is constrained by its own dependence on strong sovereignty. They suggested that China is unlikely to provoke and challenge Canada’s sovereignty in the North because of the potential that such action would undermine their own sovereignty.
• Foreign domination of northern economy emerged as a concern (bulk of metal mining owned by the Chinese; in Yellowknife, Chinese are buying up real estate.) Some argued that China tends to just ignore our regulations and they will ask their military to intervene if we try to stop them.
• Concern was raised over our complacency on the EU and freedom of navigation – in order to maintain our rights, we need to take on our responsibilities fully. If they are our waters, it is not just a matter of pride but taking action and ensuring the safety of communities and the waters there. It is perhaps not an imminent threat but it is important to send a message now.
• Weak international governance in the Arctic is seen by many as a threat to security – Canada needs to make a strong contribution to regional governance in the Arctic.

Canadian Values and a National Focus
• One participant suggested broadening the definition of how we view security to include the security of Canadian values. All defense policy, as with foreign, international and commercial policies, relates to the place of Canada in the world. They argued that we need to decide if we are “bridge builders” or “one against the other.” There are significant philosophical questions that need to be addressed as they underpin how we behave. Here, specific mention was made of how we view the effectiveness of international bodies and to what extent we should participate.
• One participant argued that Canada does not face any existential threats aside from climate change. Rather this participant posited that what we face are
large strategic problems, with the common theme of uncertainty. Canada is safe but faced with great uncertainty. Threats are internationally diffuse and hard to prepare for. As a result, this participant argued we should focus on national problems that are within our scope of control.

• One participant noted that Canada does not have a strong national identity and that institutions like the CAF are important to building a stronger one. Not doing enough to shed light on the role the CAF plays outside of the “obvious” (natural disaster relief, involvement in military action around the world) is a risk to our national identity. We need to do more to inform Canadians of the important roles the CAF plays.

Russia, China and Japan

• Most agreed that Russia, Japan and China posed significant threats to the security of Canada and the world. There were mixed views on the extent to which the actions of these nations present imminent threats.

• One participant warned that, over the last three years, China has moved from being a cooperative partner into becoming much more aggressive. While this may not pose an imminent threat, it speaks of longer-term consequences if not taken seriously.

• Others argued that the threat is more imminent than we might think. They suggest that, in fact the process has begun with Russia’s rebuilding of its northern fleet, escalated bomber flights and fighter escorts. The U.S. reinforced its ABM Fort Greely interceptors by adding mid-level interceptors in response to North Korean actions. This spills into Russia/China as both countries say it is directed at them. Russia and China are seeing this as a threat – medium term – leading to a classic arms race. The U.S. is very willing to reactivate the battles that existed during the Cold War.

BMD and Nuclear Threat

There was extensive discussion of NORAD modernization.

• Most agreed that NORAD has served Canada well.

• There was support for pursuing Maritime warning through a multimodal mission (air and sea but not land), suggesting that we may consider expanding the naval perimeters. They also noted there were opportunities for R&D.

• Some suggested that we could consider expanding to include Mexico as part of a tri-national command. At the same time, though, they were sceptical that Canadians would support that and cautioned that it might threaten our influence at the table, noting that it would expand the scope of the discussion to a range of issues that could detract attention from the North.

• Others argued that the U.S. is the right partner. They suggest that we are already protected by the U.S. and that Canadian and American interests are too intertwined and interdependent to tackle these issues independently. While they acknowledged that our military contribution might pale in comparison to the U.S. Army, we bring diplomatic credibility to the table.

• Some argued that we should put the emphasis on strategic messaging to limit Putin’s ability to interpret our actions to serve his purposes and use that interpretation as propaganda for the Russian public.

• Several argued that it was key to pursue action without antagonism. They argued that we should adopt a strategy of international cooperation with North Korea as the prime focus, suggesting that we consider cooperative installations with Russia and China. One participant argued that this should not be limited to NORAD but should be taken on as an international issue.

• One participant cautioned that we must think beyond ballistic missiles to consider new hypersonic cruise missiles – the newest threat of nuclear tipped delivery systems. They argued that we should not focus too much effort on BMD because it will resolve itself over time as ballistic missiles are replaced by other delivery mechanisms. We need to focus on developing the ability to defend the North American continent against this new technology.

• Another warned of the consequences of transforming the North Korean missile threat from a proliferation problem into a defence problem. If we acquiesce and make defense the primary objective, then prospects for disarmament are dim. They suggested that the urgent requirement is to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat through diplomacy using the Iran model. If we institutionalize the threat by making defense the focus, we will have failed.

• Arms control was seen by many as a key element of security policy. One argued that arms control will ultimately solve BMD and it will be a prescription for
proliferation if it does not. Arms control, while not a primary responsibility of DND, is important.

Canada/U.S. Relations
• Some raised concern over an increasingly isolationist U.S. government and the potential impact on U.S./Canada relations. Several agreed that the right approach was to institutionalize the relationship and to do so before a crisis occurs.
• Some suggested that we do this by reinforcing existing institutional frameworks, referring to NATO and other integrated chains of command, and warning that forging new ties would lead to redundancy. Others suggest enlarging the institutional fabric in the Arctic by developing a new mid-level U.S./Canadian network that operates independently of national leadership; such a structure would be more sustainable and less vulnerable to political change at the top.
• Some warned that all security is driven by politics and that the next American administration will have a serious impact on us and our relationship with the U.S., particularly if Donald Trump wins the election.

Role of the CAF
Leadership in the North
• Most participants agreed that we need to take a leadership role in the North with a focus on intelligence and by using a collaborative approach (one suggested an Arctic Security working group) that would allow for cross-pollination of data, ideas and information.
• Many also called for investment in infrastructure in the North, pointing out that there can be a positive relationship between military spending and economic development. However, the responsibility of investing in the North was not seen a role of DND’s, but is the responsibility other government departments as well. One participant suggested that the current government’s infrastructure budget should include projects in the North.
• There was substantial discussion of the success of the Rangers, as well as how they should be maintained and possibly expanded, or utilized differently. Some suggested a maritime component while others called for reinforcing the existing ranks and fully implementing plans that are already in place.
  • All agreed they play an important role in forging ties with the local communities and represent the leadership of the communities. Domain awareness is an important role – we need to ensure the Rangers are well trained and well supported. Some supported increasing the number and scope of the Rangers while others argued that they should stay focused on the current mandate.
  • Many also called for employing indigenous communities to conduct surveillance. One participant asked: Who would be in a position to criticize them for defending their waters?
  • Search and rescue was seen as a key role for DND in the North and some called for a restructuring of this service; one participant called for more centralization.

Strategic Thinking/Analytical Capabilities
• Many commented that the CAF is traditionally very adept at tactical work but less so strategic thinking. Several participants advised that the CAF should invest in its ability to do analysis on an ongoing basis as part of an integrated whole-of-government approach that also extends to private and public sector organizations outside of government.
• This call for more emphasis on analysis and strategic thinking often stemmed from concern over the rise in U.S. isolationism that is, increasingly, making less us able to rely on them as a strategic lead.

Defence Capabilities and the Future of the Force
Procurement
• Some participants cautioned that we are too reliant on the U.S. which has made us lackadaisical in this area, suggesting we should focus on Canadian solutions.
  • For example, several expressed strong support for the maintenance of the shipbuilding strategy to stave off the boom and bust cycle of procurement we are in, calling on Canada to follow the Japanese and American approaches. They suggested employing the current shipbuilding strategy in the domains of air power and aerospace.
  • On the other hand, others argued that we have to be careful of building a Canadian industrial capacity for something that the Canadian demand cannot sustain. Ship building is a broad enough industry and its basic capability is applicable in a wide range of vessels. However, in some of
the more specialized industries, the Canadian demand is not sufficient to be sustainable, thereby creating an export demand we will have to manage.

- Several made the case that procurement has become too politicised. These investments require a long-term vision and strategy which cannot be established and maintained with frequent changes in government. This also results in lengthy procurement processes.

- Most agreed that it is essential that we invest in cyber security capability; however, several suggested that this is the responsibility of several departments and not just DND, and therefore time should be spent clarifying roles and developing a multi-departmental strategy. Some suggested working with partners (for example, the U.S. Special Forces).

- Some called for increased military spending while others cautioned that we need to ensure that current spending is being done meaningfully before deciding to increase spending. They called for a long-term plan driven by analysis of our needs and a strategy for where we are going to guide spending.

**Full spectrum vs. niche**

- While some questioned whether Canada needs full-spectrum capability or niche capability in one area of specialization, most agreed that we should have full-spectrum capability for several reasons:
  - We need full-spectrum capability because we do not know the future – the risk is that the Minister will have to choose a niche approach because the resources will not be there.
  - As it is perceived to be easier to scale down than scale up in a reactive scenario, we need to have full capacity to act in high intensity combat.
  - We are the most combat deployable state outside of the five most powerful states which is why we have a high standard of living and respect for equal rights – this is important for our overall strategic well-being.

- Others called for full-spectrum capability with some specialization in peacekeeping functions (e.g., certain regions of focus such as Africa, the role of women in peacekeeping, or psychological operations).
  - While some expressed concern that too much focus on “soft” security will detract from developing combat capability, others argued that the two were not mutually exclusive.
  - One participant also cautioned that we are engaged in alliance protection and not peacekeeping, citing examples such as Suez, Cyprus, the Balkans; we are dealing with our allies. Canadian peacekeeping is seen by some as a myth and say that it is really about ensuring that NATO continues to function.

**Personnel**

- The Reserves are seen as underutilized by most. One participant asked: Can we use them for special needs and to tap into parts of the nation’s skillset that are not traditionally found in the Regular Forces? One suggestion was that Reservists be used in cyber security because they bring skills not traditionally found in the military.

- One participant suggested that, as a social institution, the Reserves are very vocal and almost aggressive and warns that too much investment in the Reserves might result in propping up our industrial base which may prove too costly for the return on investment.

- Several called for a database of Reservists as a tool to better identify and utilize skillsets and capacity more strategically. Some called for a civilian database that could be leveraged in the same way.

- Several participants raised what they described as substantial issues with the wellness of CAF personnel. From issues with pay to sexual harassment, they cautioned that, if these are not outliers and are reflective of something else, there may be a disconnect in the basic contract we have with them. As a society it is incumbent on us to look after these people. There is a need to change the ethos of how we provide support from the moment they sign up for training to after they leave the Forces. We have a responsibility to them. We need more than just a commitment to doing it better; we need a very detailed examination of where we are going wrong and then must act on it.
Edmonton
Date held: May 24, 2016

List of Participants

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<td>Mr. Douglas Roche</td>
<td>Former Senator, Parliamentarian, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament and visiting Professor at the University of Alberta</td>
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Key Take-Aways

• Participants felt that defense policy should be viewed within the context of foreign policy, as well as the national security landscape as domestic and global security issues are intertwined and interrelated.
• Among the threats that Canada now faces, participants indicated that due to China’s activities in the South China Sea, Canada should consider taking a greater diplomatic stance in this area. Cyber security was also viewed as a critical area to be considered as part of Canada’s defence policy review process.
• Participants suggested that the Reserve Force should be restructured and assume the role of responding to domestic disasters as a primary responsibility. In addition, the support and training of the Reserve Force was also viewed as an important consideration.
• Participants also identified significant issues with the health and wellness of our troops that need to be addressed, as these affect both recruitment and retention. In addition to the rehabilitation of ill and injured members, efforts should be expended to reintegrate them into the workforce.

Role of the Canadian Armed Forces

• Participants felt that Canada needs to adopt a whole-of-government approach with strong linkages between defence, development and diplomacy. They also suggested that domestic and global issues cannot be separated, as there are too many interdependencies between them. A focus on a surveillance role, as well as search and rescue, and disaster relief were also suggested.

Full-Spectrum Capability vs. Specialization

• At least one participant argued that true full-spectrum capability is cost prohibitive and unnecessary but warned against taking a niche approach. They proposed a small, flexible, multipurpose military that can take on a range of missions, warning that too much specialization is costly.
• However, others cautioned that trying to build too-broad a spectrum of capability risks becoming unaffordable, suggesting that Canada should determine the tasks to be completed and then specialize based on need.
• Several called for greater leadership and oversight from the government on priority tasks. There is a perceived need to make trade-offs.
• One participant proposed restructuring the Forces to support this approach. They suggested downsizing the Regular Force Army, and moving tanks and artillery into Reserves. It was suggested that the Army Reserve could then be made responsible for domestic operations.
• Whatever the balance between niche and full-spectrum capabilities, there was general agreement that Canada needs to take a more proactive approach to defining its interests and strategy rather than responding to the needs of our allies. Canada should look to what role to play internationally while achieving security domestically.

Peacekeeping
• Some debate emerged with regard to peacekeeping, with the recognition that peacekeeping in the historical sense no longer existed, and that “peace support operations” was a more apt term. Despite this, one participant suggested that Canada should specialize in peacekeeping and called for a permanent peacekeeping force under UN direction, possibly through training peacekeepers. Determining how to apply Responsibility to Protect was viewed by one participant as a global issue.

Threats to Canada’s Security
• For the most part, participants took a very short-term view of the definition of security threats. As such, most agreed that Canada faces very few, if any, serious threats. However, many identified weaknesses and areas for improvement in Canada’s current approach to defence. Most of the discussion focused on Canada’s defence strategy now and into the future.

Relationship with the United States
• Some participants argued that as we lack the resources to defend Canada and North America, Canada must rely on the U.S. and focus on having a symbolic presence on the international stage; some called for a much stronger emphasis on international operations. Nevertheless, Canada must play a role as part of a greater alliance in which it has to support its allies. Some went as far as to say that Canada faces no threats today so where attention is focused is discretionary.

Global Threats
• China was viewed as increasingly trying to dominate the South China Sea, and as such, was seen by at least one participant as possibly posing an even greater threat than that of Russia. This participant felt that Canada needs to take a diplomatic stand, reaffirm the commitment to South Korea and be clear that Chinese actions are unacceptable and in breach of international norms. Canada should focus on its Special Operations Forces and build democratic stability to maintain international stability and resist Chinese incursion.
• With regard to Russia, some noted that Putin’s actions may be serious but his options and ambitions are limited by geography (i.e., as a land power). Others were concerned that Russia presents a serious cyber threat.
• Regardless of which government is in power, according to some participants Canada needs to invest in the tools, as well as the ability to use force. However, the question remains of what tools Canada wants and what they should do.

BMD
• Views were mixed with regard to Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).
• Some argued that spending money on BMD is not a priority and would detract from addressing challenges with core equipment and investing in our troops.
• Others contended that BMD would be a low-cost opportunity to gain credibility with the U.S., although it was also argued that Canada participation was not required and that there were other ways the U.S. would like Canada to contribute, generally through investment in core capabilities.
• At least one participant warned that participation would risk encouraging a nuclear arms race by provoking China and Russia.

Terrorism and nuclear threats
• Canada needs to modernize in order to adapt to a new, asymmetrical threat, and changing types of
warfare. As such, the Army’s training and equipment, as well as its size and structure, should be overhauled. Specifically, it was suggested that the Regular Army be reduced and become a smaller and more specialized force.

- Cyber terrorism is a serious threat and Canada is not well prepared. It was suggested that a leadership role could be taken in this regard.
- It was also argued that Canada needs to take a strong action against nuclear weapons with a focus on disarmament and non-proliferation. A coherent approach is needed. Canada has a strong history in this field. Regardless of NATO policy, Canada should work to bring NATO into harmony with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Capabilities and Defence Spending

Procurement
- Participants felt that the state of procurement processes is impeding Canada’s ability to acquire the equipment to defend airspace and coasts. Others felt that there is not enough spending on new capabilities. One participant referred to key equipment of the CAF as being “broken.”
- There was significant discussion over whether or not Canada should target spending 2% of GDP as per the NATO commitment.
- Some argued that Canada has the capacity to spend 2% and that it came down to political will, while others argued that 2% was unrealistic.
- Ultimately, all agreed that the goal should be meaningful spending (for some this means high-profile) rather than percentages and observed that due to the capital expenditures being deferred by past governments, the current government faces an enormous challenge in trading off priorities.

Arctic
- It was observed that there is a need to focus on surveillance in the North. As noted elsewhere, there was a feeling that the size of the Rangers could be increased. Further, it was observed that there is public support for focus on the Arctic. Several suggested a Centre for Arctic Training, which was viewed as an opportunity to showcase our strengths as well as appealing to NATO allies. In general, however, while surveillance and search and rescue is viewed as important in the Arctic, there was not a sense that the Arctic was opening up rapidly, and that it would not be an area in which threats would rapidly emerge.

Personnel
- Most agreed that there are significant issues with the health and wellness of Canadian troops. There is a sense that a shift has occurred from a culture of “family” among military members to one that reflects a cold and bureaucratic approach. While there is great leadership in the Chief of Military Personnel, some were of the opinion that those working on it lack capacity and capability, as well as training.
- One suggested engaging a third party to evaluate our approach to the health and wellness of troops to provide an honest evaluation and gather the evidence needed to address the issues. Another pointed to a gap in supporting the transition of ill and injured returning troops back to the workforce. Aside from assisting them in their physical recovery, participants stressed the importance of their ability to return to meaningful employment that provides them with a sense of structure and purpose.
- It was also suggested that, beyond the negative impact on the troops themselves, falling short in this area hurts recruitment and retention efforts.
- To support planning, one participant called for a database linked across departments to streamline the delivery of both compensation and services to veterans.

Reserves
- Participants spoke extensively about the Reserves. Most called for an overhaul of the structure of the Reserves and of their role, as well as improvements to recruitment, employment and retention. Several suggested that they lack the proper supports and resources and are not receiving the training they need. Some suggested they should focus solely on domestic response, mobilization and planning for pragmatic reasons.
- Others cautioned that, before building and enhancing the Reserves, there is a need to ensure that they are properly supported. The CAF needs to work with civilian employers so that Reservists can serve while maintaining meaningful employment and provide better support for their spouses. Further, employers
need to be aware of the laws regarding Reservists’ commitments, as well as the benefits of having employees in the Reserves. There were mixed views on the level of integration between Regular Forces and that of the Reserves, with some calling for fully integrated training and command while other proposed a separate budget and chain of command.

• Most agreed that IT skills required for cyber defence are found in the private sector, making cyber security an ideal role for Reservists. One argued that recruitment should be outsourced while another said it should be done in-house but through collaboration and partnerships with industry.
**Montréal**

Date held: June 27, 2016

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**Key Take-Aways**

- Many believe that Canada faces few if any existential threats and that our greatest vulnerability is how we are tackling the big strategic problems the world is facing today.
- Among the existential threats we do face, climate change, cyber security, the weakening of international institutions and the rule of law feature prominently.
- This strategy and the CAF’s ongoing activities need to be clearly communicated to the public who need to be engaged in meaningful dialogue and consultation on these issues.
- We need to focus on our troops (both CAF and Reservists) to ensure capacity for the future by better leveraging the skillsets of civilians and retraining returning troops.
- We need to focus on our relationship with the U.S. as partners both in BMD (either through surveillance support or a more active role) and defence overall to ensure lasting positive economic relations.
- Our procurement processes are cumbersome and lengthy and need to be streamlined to ensure we are equipped with the most modern technology on the market. There is a need for predictability in funding and a long-term strategy.
- Canada is uniquely positioned to play an important role in peacekeeping, state building and conflict prevention.
- We need to build public trust in and awareness of the CAF and security and defence issues.

**Challenges to Canada’s Security**

**Existential threats?**

- A few participants suggested that Canada faces no direct existential threats. They argued that while there is a lot of insecurity and conflict in the world, the threat to Canada is overstated and that we often exaggerate the volatility of the international security environment. They acknowledge that we face some risk from terrorism and cyber-attacks but that these are minimal.
- Some nuanced this position by suggesting that while we don’t face military threats, we face political...
threats. These participants suggested that Canada has a role in supporting international institutions but is limited by its size and resources urging the review to consider how Canada can make a meaningful contribution rather than “trying to do everything and be everywhere.” Specifically, they spoke of supporting NORAD and NATO and addressing the terrorist threat within Canada through agencies other than the military.

- One participant suggested that we lack cooperation between agencies when addressing the domestic terrorist threat – citing the inability of the various security forces to communicate on the ground during the shooting on Parliament Hill. They pointed to no common Standard Operating Procedures, rules of engagement or radio communications channels.
- Conversely, others disagreed stating that our dependence on the global economy and increasingly integrated technology and infrastructure networks mean that threats globally and in other parts of the world threaten our security in a very real way.
- Further, several argued that technology (including chemical and biological weapons as well as cyber-attacks) can be used remotely by relatively small groups of people to pose a significant threat to Canada’s security. Also raised during this discussion was the potential for North Korea to launch a nuclear attack. They called for an expeditionary force to address international issues.
- In the same vein, a participant suggested that the changing nature of our population as a result of an influx of immigrants makes conflict elsewhere more relevant to Canada’s security. Not only can these populations import microcosms of the conflict they left behind, it is important to recognize that their issues are concerns for Canada. This participant suggested that diversity in Canada speaks to the Canadian personality – one of tolerance, openness and an appreciation for differences that we should draw on to help address issues in other parts of the world. They also mentioned Canada’s appreciation of the rule of law underlining the importance our role in encouraging others to abide by it and other regulatory regimes (e.g. climate change, conflicts, and refugees).
- Others pointed to the unpredictability of the international security environment as a significant threat, suggesting that Canada’s challenge is maintaining organizational flexibility to be able to respond.

Climate Change

- One participant raised the threat posed by climate change pointing to the fires in Alberta. Specifically, they raised the issue of the dissolution of borders in the face of environmental threats and the challenge of international or inter-regional cooperation in responding.

International Institutions, the Rule of Law and Conflict Prevention

- Several participants posited that there is a weakening of international institutions (Brexit and the Middle East) as well as increasing threats to the global economy, which is making it more difficult to contribute and form alliances to strengthen institutions.
- One participant suggested we are too focused on threats and not focused enough on strengthening alliances and conflict prevention. For example, we are currently sending forces to the Middle East and Europe where there are conflicts but there are areas where we should be building stronger and closer ties to prevent conflict.
- Others suggested that the UN is not as respected as it could be and that Canada could play a role in reversing this trend. They say that, despite the many efforts to increase the respect of that body of law, there are high-profile cases in the Middle East and elsewhere that are evidence that it is not being abided by. Canada could symbolically and practically be able to bring to the table a notion of rule of law not common across the international system right now.
- Also mentioned was the refugee system. One participant argued that the current approach is too focused downstream, saying that we need to look upstream; we could play a role in prevention and building the resilience of countries surrounding Syria and Iraq to be sure the conflict doesn’t find itself at our doorstep.

U.S./Canada Relations

- Several participants raised the question of our dependence on the U.S. As a result, there was significant debate over whether or not we should continue to rely so heavily on the U.S. for our security needs
or take a step away from this reliance towards developing a more independent approach.

• Some argued that we are too dependent on the U.S. for several reasons:
  - Some said that our defense strategy and funding is too influenced by the waves of political change both at home and in the U.S. and that Canada needs a long-term strategy and commitment of resources. They suggest that Canada’s reliance on the U.S. means that it never makes defense a priority except in the face of a direct threat. They called for establishing some basic facts about current capabilities and resourcing to inform this longer-term view instituting some stability to the military’s mandate and funding to allow it to act effectively and strategically regardless of political change.
  - Others raised the possibility that seismic changes in U.S. politics may be imminent and that the assumptions on which we base our reliance could change drastically, arguing that we need to at least consider the possibility there may come a time when we can no longer take or relationship with the U.S. for granted. They suggested doing some diplomacy with the U.S. and considering stronger ties with others.
  - Others argued that our reliance on the U.S. is not a vulnerability but rather a necessity.
  - One participant pointed to the domestic and military implications of a cyberattack on critical infrastructure as an example of how our security is innately tied to that of the U.S. While the threat was described as low probability, it is seen as high impact; they suggested that the recent move by the U.S. to invest in security in this area is one that we should follow.
  - Several others argued that our relationship with the U.S. does not threaten our sovereignty and that the benefits of it for Canada are astronomical. They argued that we will always be dependent because of our relative size and resources and the focus should be on maximizing the benefit and limiting costs. One participant argued that we are not a “free rider” but an “easy rider.” What we don’t spend on military is spent elsewhere and improves the economy for everyone’s benefit.
  - Others suggested that we should focus on consulting with representatives of the U.S. government and military to understand what they need from us, to align our strategy and to improve interoperability.
  - Several suggested that our reliance is not just for security but also economic stability and that there often are quid pro quos in politics that can have economic ramifications.
  - One participant cautioned that engaging in quid pro quos is that the benefits seem to be directly related to the specific effort that we contribute but don’t necessarily equate to a better hand at the table on other issues. They also said that there is little lasting benefit in negotiations; continued investments are what matter, not relying on credit for past actions.
  - Some participants suggested that we overestimate our dependence on the U.S., citing examples of Canada acting independently. They suggested that too much emphasis is put on the possible retributions on the part of the U.S. should we make an autonomous decision; the overstated fear can be constraint on our ability to act.

That said, all agreed that there would always be some level of interdependence with and reliance on the United States. When discussing how that partnership should be managed, several points were raised:

• Some suggested that the goal should be to strike the right balance between how much we can afford to invest and to NOT invest without upsetting the Americans.
• One participant suggested the right strategy for striking this balance is to play a niche interoperable role.
• Others called for a more concrete goal than our present objective of “being seen as a good ally.”

The Reserves
Several participants said that Canada needs to focus on its Reservists. They raised several areas of concern:

• There is poor integration of civilian and regular forces leaving them vulnerable.
There are few services for Reservists and they tend to be of poor quality. They are poorly treated during active duty. They are under resourced. They are underutilized.

• Several raised the issue of a lack of understanding of the skillsets and capabilities of Reservists as well as a lack of stability in funding and training. One participant called for regular and imposed joint exercises as well as specific protocols for fire, flood, etc. response specific training and preparation protocols.

Public Knowledge of and Trust in the Military
• Several pointed to a lack of public knowledge and awareness of the CAF’s role, mandate and activities which leads to distrust and makes it difficult to garner public support for investment. While they tend to be positive about the CAF, most don’t see defense and security as priorities and have poor knowledge of the threats we face, the work the military is engaged in and the stakes in the international arena.
• They further suggested that the public’s trust in the military is important to Canada’s identity. To build trust, they recommend ensuring that the CAF reflect the diversity of Canada’s population and the shared values of Canadians. They noted that trust and positive perceptions of the military are important for recruitment.
• Some also suggested the need to better communicate the role and value of the CAF abroad.
• Several suggested that the Security Defence Forum should be revived to support efforts that raise the visibility of the CAF and generate analytical thinking on military issues.

CAF role in addressing threats and challenges, capabilities and the Future of the Force
A need for predictability in funding and a long-term strategy
• In setting the context for the discussion, one participant, with the agreement of a few others, suggested that it is difficult to discuss the specific role the CAF should play without a clear mandate and long-term strategy for what it is trying to achieve and clear direction on resourcing and budgets.
• Further, others argued that we need to focus on the long term and stop “reinventing the wheel” by dismantling our capabilities at the end of every conflict. They suggest that we build capabilities in a reactive way and then don’t maintain what we have developed once they are no longer needed. They suggest this cycle is driven by the lack of a long-term vision and is wasteful.
• Raised again in this context was the challenge posed by the notion that defense spending and strategy is driven by politics. One participant said that politicians make choices and the military is stuck with those decisions. For example, we have a great debate in this country about how we think about our military interventions; should we invest in conflict prevention or war fighting? While conflict prevention is an important role to play and is less costly on many levels than conflict resolution, it is hard to get support and buy-in for conflict prevention.
• There was clear support for the suggestion that defense strategy should be guided by foreign policy. Many suggested that our rapport with the U.S. and other allies will drive defence policies.
• In discussing strategy, several called for a whole-of-government approach, although one participant expressed skepticism over taking that notion too far. While they acknowledge that defense does require diplomacy, they questioned the bureaucracy’s ability to surge capacity in the face of conflict.
• In this same vein, another highlighted the importance of maintaining the independence of humanitarian aid and the distinction between humanitarian action and combat action.

Peacekeeping
• When discussing the need for a strategy, one participant suggested that the strategy should consider our relative strengths, stating that one of Canada’s key fortes is its peacekeeping operations. This lead to a discussion of Canada’s role in peacekeeping.
• Several agreed that Canadian values, our credibility on the international stage and our experience in this area could make a significant difference in training as well as operations. One pointed to the value of an investment of Canadian ethos and values where peacekeepers are operating globally calling for Canadian leadership in peacekeeping.
• Some cautioned that while peacekeeping should
be a key focus, we still need full-spectrum capacity. They acknowledge that we might be stronger in some areas than others, but we still need some level of functioning across the board.

• In response, one participant argued that a focus on peacekeeping doesn’t have to result in the neglect of other capabilities. They suggested that peacekeeping requires combat (e.g., protection of civilians) and therefore investment in peacekeeping capability requires an investment in combat capability.

• An example of this was raised by several who suggested that there is a perception that we have lost our peacekeeping capability because of our work in Afghanistan. However, the reality is that there is a lot of overlap between the skills developed and utilized there and those required for peacekeeping. They suggested that we need to find a model (similar to but better than the Pearson Peacekeeping Centres) that allows us to reinforce the capacity we acquired in Afghanistan to translate it into peacekeeping operations.

• A further nuance to the distinction, or lack thereof, between peacekeeping and combat was the idea that what can be seen as armed conflict by some can be seen as peacekeeping or even conflict resolution by others. One participant cautioned that we need to be clear about how we define our actions in this space. Whether or not the action is defined as combat has ramifications in international law (e.g., there can be rights afforded to the wounded if we accept that it is an armed conflict.)

• There was discussion of how and where we should do peacekeeping; should we do broad coverage with small contributions, or one operation with one big contribution? Most agreed that it will ultimately be a political decision, though some argued for fewer more significant, high visibility contributions with large numbers of troops.

• One participant cautioned that we don’t have the resources to “compete on the numbers game,” but that we are competitive in training and professionalism in peacekeeping. They called for a focus on a meaningful contribution with a long-term strategy over a strategy of broad coverage.

• One participant called for better coordination with humanitarian organizations in peacekeeping.

Cyber

• There was some discussion of our role in cyber defence. One participant pointed to what they described as the myth of our cyber capacities. They posited that cyber is a domain that is evanescent where we face significant vulnerabilities. Several agreed that while the military has a role to play and that the CAF should not be primarily responsible for it.

• Within the discussion of cyber, some raised the issue of autonomous weapons. At first glance, there is agreement that UAVs are beneficial but that the implications of their use need to be further examined and given serious consideration.

Personnel

• One participant spoke at length regarding health in the Forces. They said that veterans are abandoned by the CAF, describing health services for veterans as reactive and not proactive. While we are closing military hospitals based on the premise that the provincial system can handle it, we are also cutting provincial hospitals. They recommended reopening five military hospitals for surgery and a limited number of beds for recovery, suggesting that the clinics already exist and would only require some additional equipment.
**Halifax**
Date held: June 28, 2016

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<tr>
<th><strong>List of Participants</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Name</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mr. David A. Beitelman</td>
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<td>MGen (Ret’d) Richard Blanchette</td>
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<td>Dr. Brian Bow</td>
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<td>LGen (Ret’d) Roméo Dallaire</td>
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<td>Cdr (Ret’d) Colin Darlington</td>
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<td>V Adm (Ret’d) Glenn Davidson</td>
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<td>Dr. Maya Eichler</td>
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<td>V Adm (Ret’d) James King</td>
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<td>LCdr (Ret’d) Dr. Heather MacKinnon</td>
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<td>Dr. George MacLean</td>
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<td>Maj. (Ret’d) Eva Martinez</td>
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<td>Supt. Robin McNeil</td>
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<td>Dr. Darin Reeves</td>
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<td>Dr. Denis Stairs</td>
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**Key Take-Aways**
- There is a need for a clear defence strategy to support the development of defence policy and that strategy should be strongly linked with and driven in part by foreign policy.
- This strategy and the CAF’s ongoing activities need to be clearly communicated to the public who need to be engaged in meaningful dialogue and consultation on these issues.
- We need better and more strategic management of our relationships with allies and partners.
- Our biggest existential threats are climate change, cyber security, and the rise of non-state actors.
- We need to focus on our troops (both CAF and Reservists) to ensure capacity for the future by better leveraging the skillsets of both Reservists and Regular Forces personnel, and retraining returning troops.
- There is a need to better integrate VAC and DND to offer a more efficient and effective framework of supports for all personnel (whether Reserve, Regular Forces, retired or active duty).
- More parliamentary oversight of defence to facilitate a more integrated, whole-of-government approach to all government priorities.
- The CAF needs a clear mandate with regard to domestic issues with better coordination for disaster relief efforts.
- We need to invest in research and development in the area of defence and security.
- There is a need to reinforce sovereignty in the North through investments in the Rangers and infrastructure to sustain communities and encourage settlement over the long term. Surveillance in the North was also seen as a priority.
• Gender-based analysis needs to be considered as a priority in the development of a new defence policy.

Threats and Challenges

Strategy and Oversight
• In setting the context for the discussions, several participants suggested that, before conducting a policy review, a national security strategy should have been developed. They emphasized the need to think strategically and to provide a framework within which consideration could be given to policies. In echoing this sentiment, one participant suggested that the strategy should also provide a lens through which foreign policy “drills down” through defence policy.
• In the context of that need for strategy, one participant suggested that the current approach lacks a gender-based analysis lens, highlighting that it is an international obligation and noting that the defence consultation document lacks reference to it.
• Another suggested that we overestimate the degree to which we are secure because we do not perceive any direct existential threats. They suggested that we need to be more wary of how quickly conflict elsewhere can pose a direct threat at home, pointing to the Asia-Pacific area as one where the dynamics of key players are changing and we must act.
• There was debate over whether Canada lacks mechanisms for effective parliamentary oversight. Mention was made of Section 14 of Bill C-22, which was seen as including a series of exceptions to what can be considered as oversight, citing that there is specific mention that no oversight is to be permitted in anything that has to do with military operations. Others suggested that the legislation is trying to bring about the ability of Parliament to avoid being in the position of having to conduct an “after-action assessment.”
• The need for parliamentary oversight was further justified by the notion that all of our domestic and international activities are integrated, resulting in a need for integrated intelligence with oversight so all actors have complete information on what is happening in Canada and overseas.

Whole-of-Government
• In the context of the debate over strategy and parliamentary oversight, the question was raised as to what extent the government should take a whole-of-government approach.
• Some pointed to mixed results. They argued that while it is effective in the domestic context, it presents practical challenges for tactical operations, particularly in a bureaucratic setting.
• Others argued that the whole-of-government approach put in place in Afghanistan was a success and that we have not maintained or leveraged what we learned there. They argued that we need to focus on building the capacity of the Canadian government and not just defence.

Defined by our Commitments to our Allies
• Many suggested that how we perceive our threats and how we behave are defined by our commitments to our partnerships and allies which are at the core of peace and security. Information exchange and interoperability are key.
• A distinction was made between legally binding allied agreements and partnerships, with some suggesting that more emphasis should be placed on non-binding partnerships and their place in defence and security (e.g., Mexico, South America, Central America) than is currently the case. At the same time, there was agreement that partnerships should be treated differently from treaties.
• One participant argued that, in this context, our main strategic decisions are about the scale of engagement that Canada has in these partnerships and alliances, extending beyond NATO and NORAD to multilateral agencies. Classic alliances are not enough – we should look to other regional bodies like the African Union in engaging potential threats.
• Some argued that a good starting point for increasing our engagement with partners and allies would be to increase our NORAD involvement, while another suggested that too much focus on NORAD distracts from other, more important commitments that are less narrow in scope.
• Several participants called for better, centralized management of how we handle these relationships and a clear strategy driven by a better understanding of what we hope to draw from them.
• This was echoed by another who called for a strategic statement on what we are trying to achieve in this regard, and yet another who pointed to the Per-
manent Joint Board of Defence as an effective model with a lot of potential. They suggested appointing more senior politicians at the leadership level to increase its legitimacy and effectiveness.

• Another commented that, while we want to bolster partnerships, we lack follow-through on partnership commitments.
• One participant suggested that we are lagging behind our allies in integrating gender-based analysis.

Public Perception at Home and Internationally
• Some suggested that there is a decreasing appreciation among the general public of the relevance of defence and security, and that becoming irrelevant in the eyes of the public presents the greatest danger to the CAF and other security forces. They called for a continuing conversation with the public that helps to educate and engage.
• Most also agreed that how we are perceived on the international stage, and more particularly by our allies, was an area of vulnerability, suggesting that we need to understand what they know about our current engagements and ensure we are strategic about how we communicate with them.
• In terms of how Canada is perceived internationally, there was general agreement that, while we are generally welcomed on the ground and valued for our “lack of colonial baggage” in diplomatic matters, views are mixed. Several suggested that we are respected for our competence and expertise in handling equipment and our respect for international doctrines, but that the level of that respect depends on the extent of our engagement.
• One participant cautioned that we should increase the significance and the visibility of our engagement in the Arctic because we are not meeting expectations in this regard.
• In considering the importance of how Canada is viewed on the international stage, one participant cautioned that the issue of how Canada is perceived is driven by a different dynamic than some think. They said that we have a tendency to focus on our extensive contributions in the past while by and large that does not matter to allies. The focus should be on our current activities and what we plan to do in the future.

Spread of Plutonium
• One participant argued that the only existential threat Canada faces is the spread of plutonium (and other materials) getting into the hands of terrorists.

Cyber
• One participant suggested that we face a significant cyber threat, saying that we are “vulnerable and terribly exposed.” They suggested that we need to develop this capacity quickly and make cyber security a top priority. There was general agreement that Canada is lagging behind on this issue and that we have an opportunity to be leaders in this area.

Surveillance in the Arctic and Climate Change
• There was limited discussion of climate change with most agreeing that it was not a defence issue.
• Several participants posited that we should focus on the Arctic, particularly with regard to increased surveillance.

Non-state Actors
• Some suggested that, today, the biggest existential threat to Canada’s security is the increasing threat of non-state actors mobilizing supporters here at home and carrying out terrorist attacks around the world. One participant said that the most significant threat is a non-state actor like ISIS deploying a crude nuclear weapon in North America.
• Most agreed that non-state actors are behaving differently than in the past and that we need a new strategy for dealing with them. These non-state actors pose a significant threat for several reasons:
  o They operate with no respect for the rule of law.
  o The use of new information and communication technologies to organize and galvanize support.
  o They are increasingly taking advantage of the power vacuums created by failed states to mobilize.
  o Massive movements of populations disconnected from their natural environment, transplanting conflict and groups connected to conflicts into stable zones.
• One participant cautioned that, while we must focus on the threat and act to eliminate it, it must not be at the expense of our freedoms (torture, Guantanamo Bay, the Patriot Act).
• Some pointed to the fact that this threat presents a multigenerational conflict because they are based on the massive employment of youth.

• Role of the Forces in Canada today and into the Future

Domestic Operations
• There was significant discussion of the role of the CAF in domestic issues, particular with regard to disaster response.
• While some called for a legislative policy change to give the CAF a clear domestic mandate, others cautioned that the priority should be to first ensure we are using resources to their maximum potential and focus on better cooperation and integration.
• One participant suggested that domestic operations have to be secondary to being a combat force, expressing the fear that, if we build and buy for domestic operations, it will take away from our ability to carry out combat missions internationally.
• There was general agreement that the role of the CAF in aid to civil authority is an important factor in how Canadians perceive the CAF and that more needs to be done to clarify and communicate their role among the general public. Increasing the visibility of these activities (e.g., Fort McMurray, Swissair, etc.) improves public perceptions and helps encourage recruitment and support for defence overall. Furthermore, some pointed to the risk to the reputation of the CAF if this is not done right.
• Several participants called for improved interoperability and cooperation between the CAF and civilians in domestic issues, suggesting a need for more joint training exercises, planning and better communication.
• One participant called for a review of the role of the National Security Advisor, suggesting that it has the potential to be a multidisciplinary focal point in a whole-of-government approach with a focus on contingency planning, the anticipation of operational needs, and with the authority to pull in support when needed.
• There was also general consensus that the Reserves are particularly useful for domestic operations because they can get there quickly, though most called for better resources and training.

Personnel

Veterans
• Overall, there was general agreement that we need to “close the seam between DND and Veterans Affairs” with a call for better integration and cooperation.
• One participant suggested that Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC) be moved within DND to create a sense of loyalty and ensure the continuum of support by marrying up services across both departments.
• Several specific suggestions with regard to our treatment of veterans were made:
  • We need to invest in research in the area of veterans’ health.
  • The transition interview should be conducted with family members present.
  • Military resource centres should be open to veterans.
  • Reservists should be given better access and more effort should be made to communicate with them about the resources available.
  • We need to develop a transition service for medical care. Many veterans do not have family doctors; they often have complex medical issues and paperwork requirements and, as a result, finding a family doctor willing to take them on can be challenging.
  • There is a need to address gender discrimination, harassment and the stigma around mental health.
  • There is a need for a better end-of-career transition, using skillsets of retired veterans.

Reservists
• Several also called for closing the seam between the primary force, Primary Reserves and the Supplementary Reserves. There was agreement that the Reserves and Regular Forces each bring unique and complementary skills and that they could be better leveraged if there was more integration in how these resources are managed.
• Several also suggested that there needs to be a culture change in how Reservists are viewed; there is currently an ingrained notion that Reservists are second best. This needs to be overcome.
• There is a need to find ways to help industry support Reservists (e.g., secondments).
• Rangers should be full time employment on land and on water.

Recruitment and Retention
• Most agreed that we face significant challenges with recruitment and retention for both Reservists and Regular Forces. Specific suggestions included:
• Raise the visibility of what opportunities exist in urban centres.
• Engage the various Cadet Programs that exist and consider investing in “camp-like” programs for youth.
• Recruit more women, Aboriginals and visible minorities to better reflect Canadian society.
• Reinstate Defense Security Forum to engage defense-centric research and programming at both undergraduate and graduate levels. According to one participant, it provided four key benefits:
  ° An interface for the CAF with the rest of the country
  ° Dissemination of research in the field – critical defence research
  ° A direct means for policy input for Canadians and non-military into defence
  ° Public engagement – conferences, town halls, sessions, etc.
• Simplify the recruitment process – currently takes too long to recruit and train.
• Improve the experience of Reservists to make it more attractive – “make being a Reserve fun again.”
• We need to use all of the tools that most young people use today to attract, recruit and employ including more flexible working arrangements and education subsidies.
• Universality of service makes no sense; we need to find ways to employ injured soldiers.
• Procurement is tied to recruitment and retention. We have an opportunity to move on procurement and it is imperative we take advantage of it. We need to really take a look at a whole-of-government approach to procurement.

Training and Support
• Many agreed that family resources centres are underfunded.
• Several suggested that training needs to be done more strategically with a more formal education structure and more thought given to language training beyond English and French.

Force of the Future
• Some overarching comments were made on the future of the CAF:
• Some called for increasing the size of the Army, noting that it is currently smaller in size than the RCMP.
• The question of who will make the strategic decisions needed to inform defence spending was raised, as well as how we will decide how much new funding is needed.
• One participant pointed to a gap between resources and commitments with specific reference to the Canadian National Action Plan for integrating gender-based analysis, suggesting that the previous plan was not realized and pointing to a need to go beyond the rhetoric to action in this area.

Technology
• Several posited that the future of the CAF will be heavily influenced by technology. Specific reference was made to the increasing use of drones for security and safety, calling for more research in this area. There was discussion of the benefits and risks of drones. While they offer, among other things, endurance and the ability to operate in harsh conditions, they still require a human element that is vulnerable to error. Some suggested that we should consider the complex, innumerable and, in some cases, still unknown ramifications for personnel and equipment.
• One participant spoke of the development of the exoskeleton concept (in essence a “robo-soldier”) that will be a significant enhancement on ships but more particularly in the land battle.
• Others pointed to cyber security, noting that we have been the target of non-state actors attacking our networks. They called for a well thought-out policy response.

Low Tech
• While there was much discussion of the impacts of technological innovation on the future of the CAF, some cautioned that too much focus on technology distracts from the increasing use of “brutal medievalism,” referencing the use of child soldiers and sexual violence.
• They called for better trained and educated security actors who are capable of identifying the warning signs and intervening effectively. They also pointed to the kinetic and psychic effects of facing children on the battlefield.

Research and Development
• Several called for the government to “let loose the scientists” saying that R&D is doing very well within the resources that it has but that we need to allow for greater investment in this area as well as more open debate and enhanced cooperation.
• There was also discussion of the defence industrial base. We have to be more strategic about how the industrial base is supported, developed and managed. We have to decide how much we are willing to spend on our own armed forces and how much we are prepared to export.
• One participant suggested that we have an excellent source of armoured vehicles in southern Ontario and that we should be prepared to sell them to “reasonable people for reasonable purposes.”

The North
• Several participants raised the issue of a need to demonstrate our sovereign ownership of the Arctic through exploration, and a broadening of the CAF’s and Coast Guard’s mandate in the North to include support of other governments’ use of our infrastructure and better cooperation. They also called for increased funding of activities in the North.
• One participant called for the Rangers to be held as full-time Reservists with full benefits so that they can be engaged in sustaining communities and infrastructure rather than survival. They also suggested creating a northern corps of engineers (similar to the American Corps of Engineers) and an investment in better optimized equipment.
### List of Participants

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Jim Barnes</td>
<td>Director - Canada, Global Marketing, Boeing Defense, Space and Security</td>
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<td>Mr. Charles Bouchard</td>
<td>Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin Canada</td>
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<td>Mr. Brian Carter</td>
<td>President, SEASPAN</td>
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Key Take-Aways

• Overall, participants welcomed the opportunity to participate and encouraged further and more frequent dialogue between industry and government.
• There is a need for the creation of an industrial strategy to support DND objectives that is embedded within a national industrial policy. There is a strong need for greater alignment and coordination between government departments.
• DND should engage in ongoing dialogue with industry on direction/strategy to create the level of predictability industry is seeking to justify risk taking.
• Coordinating objectives and projects from all departments will help to put forth a cohesive vision and appropriate guidance for procurement.
• Intellectual Property (IP) has become an important factor in all negotiations and its blanket inclusion as a standard in all Requests for Proposals (RFPs) is unnecessary and is resulting in increased costs. The inclusion of IP should be considered on a per project basis and only included when there is clear and strong rationale for doing so. DND must define overall strategic direction and long-term vision upon which procurement and industries can base their decisions/direction.
• Procurement policies/process must change to support R&D partnership and innovation. Recognizing that there are risks to innovation, procurement should offer an appropriate procurement platform to support leading-edge Canadian technologies.

Challenges Associated with Promoting a Competitive and Innovative Environment for Canada’s Defence Industry

• Overall, participants were in clear alignment on the key challenges of promoting a competitive and innovative environment for Canada’s defence industry. First and foremost, participants said the lack of a clear, long-term defence industrial strategy makes it challenging to know where and how to invest. Second, the blanket standard Intellectual Property (IP) clauses in Request for Proposal (RFP) processes lead to unnecessary costs and delays. There was also significant discussion, prompted by a question from the panel, on the role of partnerships between industry, government and academia in spurring innovation. Finally, participants agreed that Canadian innovation would flourish if Canadian companies were given an advantage in competitive bids.

Strategy and Vision

• Regardless of industry or role, all agreed that there is a need for more certainty and predictability in government spending on defence procurement to allow industry to make investments in innovation.
• There was a general consensus on the view that Canada lacks an overarching vision and strategic direction to guide the defence industry procurement. There was also clear acknowledgement that a strategy for defence procurement must be integrated into an overall strategy for government procurement, noting that there are significant areas of overlap in departmental procurement needs in a context of often competing agendas.
• They agreed that a lack of clarity and of certainty (i.e., government purchasing intent) that something can be profitable is a significant barrier to engaging intellectual capacity. While they don’t expect government to make guarantees around specifics, there needs to be some indication of the long-term plan for procurement and continued engagement with industry as the strategy evolves.
• More specifically, several participants highlighted the need for a clear strategic direction/vision from the government as to what it wants to accomplish:
  0 What solutions are needed?
  0 What does it want developed domestically versus what it plans to acquire externally?
• Ultimately, participants called for further and more frequent engagement with industry on the government strategy so that they could anticipate where investments in innovation will result in a sustainable market.
• They further indicated that a vision and direction is needed to ensure better coordination between the various federal departments.

Intellectual Property

• Several participants suggested that the inclusion of IP requirements as a standard clause in all Requests for Proposals led to unnecessary costs and delays in the procurement process and act as a deterrent to bid for some.
• There was general consensus that IP has become a more prominent aspect of all negotiations and procurement activities and that its usage (software, design, hardware, etc.) in a solution needs to be fully understood. Acknowledging that ownership of IP determines the degree to which Canada can control and support the assets/solutions it acquires, they suggested that, given the challenges presented by IP requirements, it should only be included when there is a clear need for it.

• It was felt that procurement officials should understand the value of IP on a per opportunity/solution basis: its costs (direct and indirect such as storage, maintenance and safeguarding), its lifecycle, its potential for generating revenue, and whether whole, partial or no ownership is required for the long-term viability of a solution.

• Many are looking to the government for direction as to what it wants from a sovereignty, sustainment and development perspective with regard to IP.

• One participant also flagged other important factors to be considered with IP ownership: costs, storage, evolution/maintenance and safeguarding.

• Lack of Incentives to Invest in Partnerships with Academia and Governments

• Participants were asked specifically about industry partnerships with governments and academia. Overall, participants agreed that they were already investing in these and were open to partnering in this way but that there were not sufficient incentives either for academics or industry to spur this kind of innovation.

• It was noted by many that Canada has a good track record when it comes to innovation and strong links between industry and academia already exist but that the lack of an industrial strategy makes it difficult for innovations to come to market.

• They further agreed that there is a need a national industrial strategy that will support and encourage industry and academia to invest time and money in research and development.

• They suggested incentives for industries to partner with government that provide clear direction and roadmaps with deadlines, consultation with industry on best solutions/optimization of solutions and more predictability of revenue streams taking into consideration single user versus the opportunity to sell to others.

• For this to happen, participants said that government and procurement plans need to be open to taking risks and be flexible – not all projects will be successful and some will morph as time goes. For something to be truly innovative, there has to be a chance that it will fail.

• One participant suggested that governments should take a portfolio approach to innovation. For optimal returns on any investment there has to be some risk; it has to be acceptable that some investments will fail, provided the portfolio on the whole is successful.

• Several suggested that we should build on successes with industry and foster ongoing sustainability. Sapphire was referred to as a project where Canadian industry, backed by the government and its policies, demonstrated its strength in the aerospace industry and became a global leader. Canada appears to have lost momentum in this industry and lost personnel to other global companies/organizations.

• All agreed that there are already a vast number of programs to support innovation in Canada, they need to be looked at as a whole to look for redundancy and complementarity so that we can draw optimal benefit from what already exists.

• One participant suggested that DND map innovation driven through Scientific Research and Experimental Development (SR&ED) and Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP) since it has never been done.

• Several agreed that developing a list of all federal research and development investments, programs and projects would allow them to be better understood and leveraged to support an overall industrial policy. One participant said that it appeared all of the pieces may be there; we just need to see how they fit together and draw greater benefit from them rather than looking at developing new programs.

• In addition, one participant suggested that there should be a tracking of all ongoing projects and programs to identify duplication and the potential for combining programs to provide more efficient and cost-effective solutions.
Supporting Canadian Innovation

• All agreed that for Canadian companies, doing business in Canada should be an advantage not a disadvantage. To see a return on the longer-term investments in innovation, partnership and a national industrial strategy, Canada must be willing buy the solutions that are generated in Canada.

• Many agreed that Canadian companies are more scrutinized. They said that when they compete in other countries the “home team” always has an advantage but that when they compete against foreign companies in Canada, they are often subject to more scrutiny than the global competition. Specific mention was made of contract renewals that trigger audits and “tremendous oversight” from the Crown, even more so than foreign companies.

• Many commented on ways to foster better support of Canadian innovation and put forth the following recommendations:
  o Need to change/adapt views on competition to secure solid partnership in R&D efforts;
  o Recognize industry contribution and ensure they are incentivized and compensated;
  o Change process that requires that once project is close to a final solution (sometimes after years of joint research and development efforts) it is open up to the competition;
  o Consider paying non-recurring engineering (NRE) to reward companies for innovation;
  o Create project roadmaps with measurable milestones.

Improving Procurement

• In general, most participants agreed that the procurement process needs to be updated as IP is taking a more prominent place in bids and negotiations. Procurement needs external input (legal-technical) to update understanding and set guidelines to fit the opportunities both from a local and global point of view.

• Some commented that the bidding process in Canada is becoming prohibitive and its lack of predictability may limit the number of suppliers willing to bid.

• There was also general agreement that government should increase consultation with industry on scoping and requirements to ensure they “get these right” before the procurement stage – many noted that in the commercial sector, buyers and suppliers spend significant time working through the requirements before a bid is issued.

• Several participants stated that the procurement process needed to evolve and adapt to changes from a transactional acquisition relationship to a long-term relationship and partnership with suppliers. Their recommendations included the following:
  o Change from process-driven to results-driven;
  o Clearly identify the costs and risks of a project to allow more flexibility when changes are required over time.

• Many commented on the need to establish a process to handle procurement throughout the lifecycle of a project and put forth the following recommendations:
  o Be prepared to understand and fund changes in requirements and the impact of technological changes that may arise during length of project;
  o Long term projects (10 to 30 years) are costly as they increase risks, it may be worth considering options such as reviews and negotiations at regular intervals;
  o Software – establish process to manage software upgrades and maintenance over a long period of time.
  o We need to fully understand the lifecycle of a project and what it will take to extend its life early in the process.

• It was also suggested by some that there is a need to develop procurement professionals within government. Several recommended that training should be offered to increase business acumen in procurement and project-related personnel and a need to address the impact of rotational employees in partnerships with industry.

• A few suggested that these professionals already exist but lack the framework of an industrial strategy to full optimize the procurement process.

• The concern that large original equipment manufacturer (OEMs) appeared favoured over small businesses was raised and that old policy on sole-source contracts needed revisiting. They further suggested that relationships should be better managed so that industry is not competing with the same OEMs that are also contracted to provide maintenance.
• A few noted that low-risk procurement processes and boiler-plate terms and conditions drive costs up and discourage some bidders. They can void any pre-bid research and development work done in collaboration with suppliers who took the risk to develop a government defined solution.
• Some commented that Canada’s defence procurement system lacks credibility and government appears to react to crisis vs drive innovation.
• One participant drew a comparison with the procurement of commodities, noting that it seems to work well and suggesting that the priority should be to address the large and/or strategically important procurements.
• Most agreed that policies, processes and measured output are needed in order to better manage projects and procurement processes.
• One participant suggested that we need a cultural shift from a focus on controlling cost and minimizing price to minimizing costs and maximizing value. They referenced the Sustainment Initiative and the Cost and Profit review it sparked, commending the effort for recognizing that the policy manual was missing the tools to allow procurement to consider the price and value equation. They suggested that procurement is out of step with modern commercial reality and other jurisdictions still feel that the role of government is to audit costs and set a maximum profit value.

The Role of Defence in Stimulating the Economy
• There was consensus on and a strong sense of urgency for the government (broader than just defence) to develop an industrial strategy that supports the procurement needs of DND through a roadmap for industrial development.
  o Participants agreed that a defence driven plan/direction developed jointly with industry is needed; it will provide the predictability required to incentivize industry in partnering with DND.
• Many commented that DND’s lack of strategic direction and long-term involvement with industry has resulted in boom and bust cycles in industry as well as lost opportunities for innovation and sets it further apart from the competition.
• Several participants noted that, in some countries, DND has been successful in stimulating the economy. They pointed to examples where DND obtained the deliverables they sought, and the associated research and development created opportunities for crossover technologies for the industry partner.
• Several participants suggested that DND coordinate, review and/or reinvigorate existing programs such as Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) that has proven successes in innovation while generating revenues and consult with external programs such as the Reference to Strategic Partnership for Industrial Resurgence (SPIR) program.
• Several were of the opinion that focus should be placed on the need to consider structured value proposition, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), exportability.
• One participant suggested that DND consider changing focus from primarily large programs to allow the introduction of smaller ones to foster creativity and innovation in fast paced and competitive markets.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>DRDC</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Canada</td>
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<td>DPR</td>
<td>Defence Policy Review</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Intellectual Property</td>
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<td>IRAP</td>
<td>Industrial Research Assistance Program</td>
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<td>ISIL</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant</td>
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<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Syria</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defence Command</td>
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<td>NRE</td>
<td>Non Recurring Engineering</td>
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<td>OEM</td>
<td>Original Equipment Manufacturer</td>
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<td>ONU</td>
<td>Organisation des Nations-Unies</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIB</td>
<td>Produit International Brut</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFP</td>
<td>Request for Proposal</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprises</td>
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<td>SPIR</td>
<td>Strategic Partnership and</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRED</td>
<td>Scientific Research and Experimental Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
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